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This Master thesis studies the feasibility and properties of a financial derivatives market
on Grid computing, a service for sharing computing resources over a network such as the
Internet. For the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) to perform research
with the world’s largest and most complex machine, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC),
Grid computing was developed to handle the information created. In accordance with the
mandate of CERN Technology Transfer (TT) group, this thesis is a part of CERN’s dissem-
ination of the Grid technology.
The thesis gives a brief overview of the use of the Grid technology and where it is head-
ing. IT trend analysts and large-scale IT vendors see this technology as key in transforming
the world of IT. They predict that in a matter of years, IT will be bought as a service, instead
of a good.
Commoditization of IT, delivered as a service, is a paradigm shift that will have a broad
impact on all parts of the IT market, as well as on the society as a whole. Political, economic
and physical factors advocate a market for standardized computing resources supplied by
multiple professional providers, benefiting from economies of scale. We argue for the trade
of Virtual Servers as the standardized bundle of computer resources.
Continuous trade of homogeneous resources allows for scheduling market efficiency
and liquidity, but may entail a risk of erratic, unpredictable prices. We therefore construct a
complete, coherent Grid economy, consisting of both a spot market and a derivatives market.
While the spot market is the trading place for the computer resources, the derivatives market
aims to disperse the risk among those who are willing to invest in it.
Because the Virtual Servers are non-storable assets, normal arbitrage theory cannot be
used to price derivatives contracts. We propose to solve this issue by creating storable swap
contracts priced by an auction-based market, where we argue that the price process follows
a geometric Brownian motion. Taking into account the absence of arbitrage in the swap
market and the requirement for a complete market, we offer a theoretical framework for
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This thesis is a study of the feasibility and properties of a financial derivatives market on
Grid computing, which is a service for sharing computing resources over a network. In the
following pages, we explain that a financial derivatives market is not only feasible, but de-
pending on the underlying spot market may also become a necessity. A derivatives market
offers the possibility of planning with a longer time perspective compared to spot market
trade. In addition, some contract types give the holder the possibility of unbound profit com-
bined with limited possibilities for loss. In this market, the most likely participants would
be risk mitigators selling the risk of trading on the exchange market, as well as arbitrageurs
and speculators taking opposite positions. In addition, functions such as clearinghouses and
market makers provide stability and liquidity. This derivatives market is depicted in figure
1.1.
We propose swap contracts to be the connecting link between the exchange market and
the derivatives market. The contracts in the derivatives market are then written with the
swap contract as underlying. With this little trick, we may use the standard, no-arbitrage
pricing framework to price the derivatives. We will also provide the hedging formulas and
show that the writer of the Grid derivatives manages to hedge the contract sale.. We will,
use the European swaption as a pricing- and hedging example and refrain from proposing
new and exciting contracts.
The exchange market consists of both a Continuous Virtual Server Exchange (CVSE)
and a special-purpose Over-The-Counter (OTC) market. The CVSE enjoys the greatest
quantity of trading, while the OTC market supports the CVME. On the CVSE standardized
bundles of computer resources, Virtual Servers are traded. Regarding the market partic-
ipants, Virtual Server providers are large computer centers that virtualize their physical
hardware and provide it to the highest bidder. The buyers consist of organizations that pro-
vide the Hardware layer, either internally, as a User Integrator and a Software Integrator,
or externally by selling Hardware-as-a-Service. Figure 1.1 illustrates the exchange market.
This thesis is part of CERN Technology Transfer’s dissemination of Grid technology, in
accordance to the Technology Transfer group’s mandate to disseminate inventions spinning
out of CERN’s fundamental research program. CERN is a large stakeholder and one of the
largest investors in this new technology and wishes therefore to facilitate organizations and
companies that are interested in adopting CERN’s expertise and know-how. We will look
at different aspects of the Grid and place this technology in a larger context, looking at its
potentials beyond CERN’s traditional mass-throughput computing use.
In part I we establish the need for Grid computing and look at trends pointing at a
trading market for computer resources. Chapter 2, "CERN, at the Technology Frontier",
describes the challenges this large fundamental research organization faces, with respect to
1






Figure 1.1: The complete Grid economy showing the buyers and sellers on the exchange market.
It also illustrates the use of swap contracts as the connection between the spot and derivatives mar-
kets. The derivatives market, to the left in the figure, consists of the Risk Mitigators, Arbitrageurs,
Speculators, and the supporting participants: clearinghouse and market makers.
processing and distributing data. Grid computing is a new technology in rapid development.
Much of the information and innovation regarding the commercial evolution of the Grid
is being published on blogs and Internet articles. Therefore, to get the background informa-
tion of the Grid several authors of such Internet references will have their say on the current
commercial use and future prospects in chapter 3 "Grid Computing". At the end of chapter
3, the previous chapters will be summarized.
Part II outlines an exchange market and a derivatives market for Grid resources. In
chapter 4 "Exchange Market" we propose a spot market based on a continuous auction on
bundles of computer resources, which we have baptized Virtual Servers. We discuss the
advantages and problems of such a market. The biggest problem is the possibility of large
and erratic price movements, making it difficult for organizations to plan ahead. Chapter 5
"Derivatives Market" proposes to solve this issue with a Grid derivatives market, creating
predictability. We show how to price and hedge contracts on Grid swaps and give a through-







CERN, at the Technology Frontier
In this chapter1, we take a brief look at the European Organization for Nuclear Research
(CERN), one of the users and developers of Grid computing. We describe CERN’s scien-
tific purpose, that is, the study of the smallest components of the universe, and how this
endeavor has lead to important discoveries and new technologies. The study of particles
involves a huge amount of information that need to be stored, processed and communicated
between the scientists, and this has lead to the development of Grid computing at CERN,
an enabler of advanced sharing of computer resources. Dissemination of new technologies
is an important part of CERN’s activities. To explain the origin of the Grid we will give an
overview its background in science.
This thesis is a part of CERN’s effort to disseminate Grid computing, being an integrated
part of the organizations mandate. First, we give an overview of the background for CERN
and what this centre has become. Second, we look at the world’s biggest instrument for
particle research, the LHC. Third, we briefly describe the computer challenge associated
with gathering all the data from this instrument. We then state that this problem is overcome
by Grid computing, which is the topic of chapter 3.
2.1 CERN in the History Books
The European Council for Nuclear Research was founded in 1952 with the goal of creating
a fundamental High Energy Physics (HEP) research organization in Europe. The main mo-
tive was to build up a Euopean stronghold in fundamental research. It was argued that only
a large facility could keep the scientists in Europe, and the then prestigious atomic research
was decided to form the scope of the laboratory. Nuclear science requires substantial fund-
ing, and few countries in Europe were capable of constructing large national laboratories
on their own. Therefore, a joint European effort became the answer of how to re-launch the
European research. Based on the work of the Council, the original twelve member states
ratified the convention to establish the permanent organization European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN) 2 in September 29th 1954 (Hermann, Krige, Mersits, & Pestre,
1987).
CERN, situated in Geneva, Switzerland, is the world’s largest particle physics labora-
1The information in this chapter is mostly based on the "about CERN" section at the CERN website:
www.cern.ch
2The acronym CERN is derived from the French translation of the name of the Council: Conseil Européen
pour la Recherche Nucléaire. The acronym has been kept even though the organization’s name does not contain
the same letters.
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tory (Bressan, Streit-Bianchi, & Marcastel, 2005), run by 20 member states3. 4, 500 sci-
entists from the member states and 1, 700 from non-member states, from a total of 500
universities, study and work at CERN. These scientists represent a large specter of exper-
tise, making the Organization the tone setting organization within fundamental research.
Since its inception, CERN has always been a leading actor in different fields. The
laboratory strives to understand the composition of the matter that composes the universe,
and has fostered three Nobel Prize Laureates in physics. The discovery of the W and Z
bosons rewarded Carlo Rubbia and Simon van der Meer with the Prize in 1984, while the
1992 Nobel Prize was awarded to Georges Charpak for his invention and development of
particle detectors. The Laboratory not only attracts Nobel Prizes, but has till now also
attracted half a dozen Nobel Laureates (Hämmerle, Ménard, Sutton, & Gilles, 2004).
2.1.1 CERN Today
CERN is today a European as well as a world center of fundamental research, stretching far
beyond its original raison d’être. To direct the future of the organization Dr. Robert Aymar,
the Organization’s Director General, has defined four missions for CERN. Among these,
performing research and dissemination of technology are assigned a particular importance
(CERN, 2004).
2.1.1.1 Technology Transfer
The undisputed main activity of CERN is fundamental research. However, all CERN re-
search should, according to the missions of the Director General, be directly beneficial for
society. It is stated in Article II.1 of the Convention (1953) Convention that "The results
of its [CERN’s] experimental and theoretical work shall be published or otherwise made
generally available". The member states are increasingly anxious to have tangible results
from the funds they contribute to CERN. Consequentially, CERN has created the Technol-
ogy Transfer (TT) policy and established a TT group. "The CERN Technology Transfer
activities are aimed at maximizing the technological and knowledge return to the Member
States and promoting CERN’s image as a Centre of Excellence for technology" (CERN,
2007d).
The CERN knowledge and technology dissemination is made possible using a set of
different methods, including the publishing of articles4; licensing, i.e. selling the legal
permission to exploit a patent; as well as through collaborative work with companies to
develop technologies further.
The most famous spinout of CERNs research that has been disseminated is the World
Wide Web. It was invented in 1990 by Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau in order to ease
the sharing of information between researchers. The Web soon spread to other institutions
in Europe, and three years after more than 200Web servers were in use. Today, about 19%
of the world’s population consult and edit 25 billion existing Web pages (CERN, 2007a;
WorldWideWebSize.com, 2007; InternetWorldStats, 2007). Other technologies spinning of
CERN’s research and benefiting society include technologies for renewable energy, such
as solar power; green and safe Thorium reactor technology, radiation therapies, such as
Hadron Therapy; Radiopharmaceutical compounds; and Medical imaging to mention a few
3The member states are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Many other countries, as well as the European Commission and
UNESCO, have Observer status.
4CERN published about 1, 000 articles in various journals in 2006.
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(Le Goff, 2007). However, CERN should not deviate from its original mission of fundamen-
tal research. Technology Transfer at CERN is therefore not comparable to commercially
applied research, where the focus is on selling products or technology. The technologies
and inventions commercialized from CERN are spin-offs of the fundamental research, or
developments made to facilitate research. For CERN to make advances in HEP, challenges
in many technical domains must be overcome. Cryogenics, vacuum, materials, and infor-
matics are just some of the fields that the scientific personnel at CERN need to develop as
intermediary steps towards the ultimate goal of studying elementary particles.
2.1.1.2 Tools for Performing Research
CERN’s physicists use particle accelerators to perform experiments and study the basic
building blocks of the Universe. Particle accelerators are machines that propel electrically
charged particles to travel almost at the speed of light. Radio frequency pulses push the par-
ticles forward and powerful magnets keep them in the trajectory. After reaching the desired
energy level, groups of particles are aimed at a collision point where detectors register every
detail of the impact.
What the scientists seek are rare processes occurring in the interaction points, whose
probability varies with the collision energy. This means that for physicists, the most impor-
tant parameters are the beam energy and the number of interesting collisions, given by the
intensity. As was stated at one CERN lecture by Gilardoni and Metral (2007): "The history
of accelerator physics has been a 100 year long fight to get energy and intensity to such a
level to study known and unknown particles and their interactions."
Searching for higher energies in order to understand how the Universe was created,
has led to the building of larger and more powerful accelerators than the world has ever
seen. Until the year 2000, four big particle-particle experiments were running at the Large
Electron Positron (LEP) collider complex, an accelerator with 27 km circumference. In the
spring of 2008, CERN scientists will complete the replacement of this giant machine with
an even more powerful titan, the Large Hadron Collider (LHC).
2.2 Large Hadron Collider
The Large Hadron Collider, LHC, is situated in a 27 km circular tunnel, situated about 100
meters underground at the French-Swiss border. It is the world’s largest scientific instru-
ment and will, when it is switched on in the spring of 2008, be the most powerful particle
accelerator ever built. The material cost of the LHC project is about AC7.38 billion. The
accelerator (3.03 billion), the computing (0.80 billion) and the experiments (3.55 billion5)
are the largest cost drivers (CERN, 2007c).
The LHC is a particle-to-particle collider that will produce head-on collisions between
two beams of hadron particles of the same kind, that is, either protons or lead ions. The
particle beams will be accelerated in an ultrahigh vacuum, comparable to outer space, to
prevent unwanted particle collisions (Group, 2005). The proton collisions generate, 1016
K, a temperature equivalent to a billion times the temperature of the centre of the Sun. The
particle collision recreates about 1/10 of a billion of a second after the Big Bang, i.e. the
birth of the Universe6.
5The LHC is a collaboration project where CERN’s contribution to the experiments and the computing cost
are accounted to about 20% (von Rüden, 2006; CERN, 2007c)
6Recreating the Big Bang using the LHC might seem like a bad idea, but both US and EU Specialist reports
has deemed the LHC safe (Buszaa, Jaffe, Sandweiss, & Wilczek, 1999; Blaizot, Iliopoulos, Madsen, Ross,
Sonderegger, & Specht, 2003).
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Figure 2.1: Artistic illustration of the Large Hadron Collider with the smaller, preliminary acceler-
ators. copyright CERN (Mouche, 2006).
As the particle beams travel through the 27 km long ring, 7, 000 superconducting elec-
tromagnets, operating at extremely low temperatures, will guide them. With a temperature
of−271.3◦C (1.9K), it makes the conductor the coldest object in the Universe. Each beam
will consist of nearly 3, 000 bunches of particles, where each bunch consist of 100 billion
particles. Since the particles are minuscule, i.e. 10−10 m, the chance of two particles collid-
ing is very small. When the two particle beams cross there will only be about 20 collisions
among the 200 billion particles. However, the two particle beams will cross about 40million
times per second, generating roughly about 1 billion collision events per second combined
for the four detectors.
These detectors convey as much information as the entire European telecommunications
network does today. The information produced by the LHC will account for 1% of the
information generation in the world (CERN, 2007b). This immense information production
creates information technological issues that must be addressed.
2.3 Information and Computing Challenge
The collision event data from the detectors will be heavily filtered so that only about 100
events of interest per second will be recorded permanently. Each event represents a few
Megabytes of data, so the total (continuous) data rate from the experiments will be in the
order of 1 Gigabyte per second. The LHC will in total produce about 15 million Gigabytes
of data annually, equivalent to about 3 million DVDs each year (CERN, 2007b).
In order to provide the necessary computing infrastructure for the LHC, computing
power equivalent to more than 100, 000 of today’s fastest standard PC processors is re-
quired. Even with a computer centre upgrade, CERN can only provide a fraction of the
necessary resources. The solution is therefore to connect the computing resources of the
world’s particle physicists7. The Grid computing technology makes this collaborative solu-
tion possible. The computing Grid will allow thousands of scientists to access and analyze
the LHC data in a seamless fashion, independent of their location.
The Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) was launched in 2002 to integrate thou-
7267 institutes and 4, 603 users in Europe in addition to 208 institutes and 1, 632 users elsewhere (Berlich,
2006).
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sands of computers worldwide into one global computing resource, which will be used to
store and analyze the huge amounts of data produced by the LHC. The WLCG operates the
world’s largest scientific Grid, depending in particular on two major science Grid infrastruc-
tures provided by Enabling Grid for E-SciencE (EGEE), and US Open Science Grid (OSG)
as well as several national and regional Grid structures. EGEE alone has over 240 sites in
45 countries, including more than 41, 000 CPUs and about 5 Petabytes of storage8(EGEE,
2007b).
CERN develops its own technologies, but constructs and implements them in close col-
laboration with industrial partners. In this manner technology and knowledge is transferred
through CERN’s purchases to benefit industry and society. As a result of this, the develop-
ment of the Grid for the LHC at CERN and its collaboration with industry9, has pushed this
technology closer to the commodity market (CERN, 2007b). However, CERN is only one
of the developers of Grid solutions, where others focus on the commercial market.
Chapter Summary:
This chapter has treated one of the big scientific users of Grid computing, CERN. It estab-
lished that CERN is the leading organization within particle research with a goal of spread-
ing CERN technology to societal benefit. We looked at the massive computer requirements
for the start up of the world’s largest machine, LHC. In chapter 3, we look closer at the Grid
technology and its use outside CERN, and in part II, we propose a trading market and a
derivatives market for buying and selling Grid resources.
8To monitor the Grid in real time, see: http://gridportal.hep.ph.ic.ac.uk/rtm/
9These partners include IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Oracle, SUN among others.
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Chapter 3
Grid Computing
In chapter 2 we looked at the huge computing requirements demanded by the start-up of
CERN’s new particle accelerator. In this chapter, we look at the solution to this problem,
namely Grid computing. First, we give an overview of what the Grid really is and how it
is built. Second, we discuss benefits of using a Grid and we look at companies using Grid
computing today. We propose a model of the grid-layered economics and describe some
factors pushing the dissemination of Grid. Finally, we look at the prospects for Grid in the
future, whereby we conclude that a trading market for Grid resources is probable. Different
setups of such a market are examined in chapter 4, where we will further develop this idea
by suggesting a financial derivatives market on the resources in chapter 5.
3.1 The Grid, what is it?
In this section, we give an overview of what Grid is and provide a discussion of the terms
used for this concept. We show the layered architecture of the Grid, and its ability to decou-
ple the hardware from the software.
3.1.1 The Grid explained
While the World Wide Web enables us to share information, the Grid enables us to share
computer resources, such as processing power and storage. Based on the definitions of
CERN (2007b), Oracle (2007), SUN (2007), Foster and Kesselman (2003), IBM (2007a),
Hewlett-Packard (2007), Intel (2007) we define a Grid as follows:
Definition 1 Grid is a service for sharing computer resources over a network, such as the
Internet.
The term Grid was introduced by the National Computer Science Alliance in 1997 wanting
to transform the Internet and the Web into a powerful tool for advanced computational sci-
ence and engineering: a prototype for the 21st century’s distributed computing1 infrastruc-
ture, with a name derived from the notion of the electrical power grid (Stevens, Woodward,
DeFanti, & Catlett, 1997). The analogy to the power grid, where IT resources and services
are provided as a metered service through a plug in the wall, is old. Fernando Corbató at
MIT2, envisioned in 1965 a "computer facility as a utility like a power company or wa-
ter company." (Vyssotsky, Hill, Corbató, & Graham, 1965) and in 1969, Len Kleinrock at
1Distributed computing is according to www.whatis.com, any computing that involves multiple computers,
that are remote from each other, where each have a role in a computational problem or information processing.
2The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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UCLA3 stated that " . . . we will probably see the spread of ’computer utilities’, which, like
present electric and telephone utilities, will service individual home and offices across the
country." (UCLA, 1969). Such a global utility computing Grid is illustrated in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the Grid.Copyright CERN (de Gennaro, 2003).
3.1.1.1 One technology, many names
Grid computing is an emerging technology, which is used differently by various organi-
zations and termed thereafter. The Science community, with CERN in the lead, and IT
infrastructure vendors, such as IBM (2007a), Hewlett-Packard (2007), SUN (2007), Oracle
(2007), and Intel (2007), use the term Grid computing, while other vendors use the terms
Utility computing or Cloud4 computing.
• Utility computing is according to IBM’s Gayek, Nesbitt, Pearthree, Shaikh, and Snitzer
(2004), Rappa (2004), Meyer (2003) and Accenture (2004), Willard, Joseph, and
Lamy (2007) a financial outsourcing model, run by Grid infrastructure, for delivering
specific IT services on a pay-as-you-go basis.
• Cloud computing is a service model for offering advanced Web Services over the
Internet, build on a Grid architecture (Harris, 2007d; LaFollette, 2007). Companies
using this term include Google, eBay, Yahoo, Amazon, Microsoft and IBM(Glider,
2006; IBM, 2007b).
Semantically, Grid-, Utility-, and Cloud computing are often used in an interchangeable
manner and have been somewhat blurred by various marketing strategies. According to
SUN’s CTO, Greg Papadopoulos, all these technologies are about accessing resources and
applications through a network, representing that computing move from a good towards a
service. He states that "this transition is already well on its way under names such as Grid-,
Utility- or Cloud computing" (Mitchell Waldrop, 2007). The Grid technology is, according
to Accenture (2004), an infrastructure that forms the basis of this paradigm shift, and we
therefore see these systems as a part of the term Grid computing.
3University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)
4Cloud is a term used by network professionals when illustrate the Internet (About.com:Google, 2007).
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3.1.2 The Grid layers, Hardware and Software layers
The Grid architecture can be described as being made up by layers. The Grid connects
physical computer resources, using a network and makes them appear as a virtual pool of
resources, the virtual Hardware layer. The software and applications that the users see and
interact with, is the Software layer, which lies on top of the Hardware layer.
3.1.2.1 Hardware layer
The physical resources that form a Grid may be servers; PCs; processing units; storage
units; clusters of computers; supercomputers; instruments such as telescopes; hand-held
electronic devices; sensors, e.g. RFID; PDAs; home appliances, or any device that can be
connected to a network. Since the network could be an Intranet or the Internet, the physical
resources5 in a Grid can be, and are in most cases, geographically distributed.
In order to share the physical resources between a set of users, the resources need to
be organized and integrated. The software program that performs this is termed middle-
ware. It creates the virtualized Hardware layer by using virtualization techniques (Group,
2006). Virtualization can make physical computer resources seem aggregated, emulated
and partitioned. The aggregation gathers the connected physical resources enabling them to
dynamically join and leave the Grid, making it seamlessly scalable.Emulationmakes one re-
source appear as something else and "conceals" the physical characteristics of the resources,
thereby improving the flexibility of the system. After the virtualization has aggregated and
emulated the physical resources, they appear as one entity, which can be seen as a "virtual
pool" of resources. The partitioning dynamically executes the priorities and boundaries for
how much the different users can maximally consume of the virtual pool. The resources
provisioned to a user from the pool can be dynamically and seamlessly scaled up or down,
while it is being used. This allocation rules are given in accordance to the priorities of the
organization for the situation when there is no idle capacity in the Grid and could be.
3.1.2.2 Software layer
The provisioned resources from the Hardware layer are for instance used by Virtual Ma-
chines. A Virtual Machine (VM) provides a complete environment in which an operating
system and many processes for multiple users can coexist. The VM is thus a software im-
plementation of a computer that can execute programs, giving a look and feel of using a
physical computer (Smith & Nair, 2005). The VMs run independently of each other and if
the software on one VM crashes, the other VMs run unaffected. Following from this we can
say that the Hardware layer supports the layer that the user of the Grid will see and interact
with, namely the Software layer. This layer includes all kinds of different operation systems
and user applications such as the ones needed for science, engineering, business, finance,
etc.
By aggregation, emulation and partition, virtualization creates a separation of hardware
and software. It decouples the software from the physical resources on which they rely
(Armijo & Nickolov, 2007), thus creating a Hardware layer and a Software layer.
From this, we can say that the Grid is a shared, network scaled, computer system. Grid
computing enables the virtualization of distributed computing and data resources to create a
single system image, granting users and applications seamless access to vast IT capabilities
(IBM, 2007c, 2007b). IBM explains: "just as an Internet user views a unified instance of
5Depending on the what resources that are used and where they are located, names such as Enterprise Grids,
Desktop Grids, Scientific Grids, Data Grids, Equipment Grids, etc. are sometimes used.
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content via the Web, a grid user essentially sees a single, large virtual computer" (IBM,
2007c).
3.1.2.3 Users and Sharing
The Grid as well offers the possibility of cross-organizational work both by aggregating
resources from each member and the possibility of accessing software through the network,
from anywhere in the world (Accenture, 2004). The shared resources in the Grid can span
multiple administrative and organizational domains, where users can create Virtual Organi-
zations (VOs). VOs are organizations where the members work together via, for instance,
the Internet, and are geographically spread while appearing to others as a single, unified or-
ganization (HighScalability, 2007). The Grid incorporates a Hardware layer and a Software
layer, which the users see and interact with. This is illustrated in figure 3.2. In section 3.3,
Figure 3.2: The Grid layers, Hardware layer and Software layer.
we take a look on who the users of Grid computing actually are, but first, in section 3.2 we
discuss some of the benefits of using a Grid.
3.2 Benefits, why is the Grid interesting
Is the Grid just another type of supercomputer? According to Erwin Laure, from CERN and
EGEE, a supercomputer exists to solve the most demanding computing problems, while the
purpose of Grids are to federate computation and data, which makes for an effective tool for
collaboration and dynamic reconfiguration (Harris, 2007c). The Grid provides more cost-
effective utilization, fault tolerance, flexibility and scalability, than traditional computing
systems.
3.2.1 Providing the necessary resources cheaper
One of the main benefits of Grid computing is that it allows reducing the cost of computing.
While supercomputers require custom components, a Grid can be built using standard, inex-
pensive, off-the-shelf computer components. If there is need for more computer resources,
the Grid can be dynamically scaled up adding more resources. In extreme cases, such as
for the Large Hadron Collider, Grid computing is the only way to obtain the needed re-
sources. The effect of the scaling means that the computers can be kept longer and updates
can be done gradually by adding extra resources when needed. This is an ideal situation for
start-ups, keeping their initial computer investments to a minimum, while having the option
gradually to expand with an eventual growing market.
The pooling of resources also makes it easier to handle an extension of computer re-
sources. In a traditional storage regime, the different hard drives are separate units. Adding
extra storage requires that someone has to make decisions on which files to move and must
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also notify all the users and applications on where to find their data. When a new unit is
added in a Grid, the Grid itself takes decisions concerning where to store data (Patel, 2007).
3.2.2 Improving ROI by sharing and using idle resources
In traditional computing, computers are all separate systems. Some hard drives get maxed
out, thus reducing overall performance, while others are underutilized (Patel, 2007). Most
servers only use 20% of their capacity; desktop computers only 5% to 10% (Meyer, 2003).
Grid takes advantage of the unused computing capacity using virtualization to "pool" the
shared resources. The idle capacity that was previously inaccessible is in this way made
available for use. This reduces the amount of resources wasted and improves the utilization
of the existing IT infrastructure, hence reducing the IT cost and the impact on the environ-
ment as well as the Return-On-Investment (ROI) (Wallom, 2007).
3.2.3 Access and Integration
The Grid enables sharing of geographically distributed data and computing infrastructure
between users. Grid is therefore an effective method of providing unified access to com-
putational resources (e.g. CPUs, storage systems, and data sources) irrespective of their
physical location.
3.2.3.1 Access to software
With a Grid there is no need to download the data to the local computer, since it can be
read and processed at its physical location through the Grid. A result of this, software
can easily be altered, because it is only necessary to store one copy in the Grid, which
can be accessed by all the users. This means that all the software can be updated from a
single location. Large companies are therefore using Grid architectures to provide various
business application and services (Strong, 2007). Employees can then access these business
applications through a Web portal, instead of installing them locally. The whole Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) system may be outsourced to ERP-vendors who offer a Web-
interface on this service (Currie & Seltsikas, 2001).
3.2.3.2 Flexibility of access
Access to the Grid and its resources can be provided anywhere in the world where there is a
broadband Internet connection. This is especially useful for devices with little or no internal
processing power or storage, termed thin clients, such as PDAs and cell phones, enabled by
the next generation of mobile networks, see section 3.3.4.1. These handheld devices can
become gateways to the computer resources and data in the Grid (Kumar & Song, 2005;
Mattmann & Medvidovic, 2006).
3.2.3.3 Collaboration
Geographically dispersed individuals, or groups across multiple administrative domains can
create Virtual Organizations, mentioned in section 3.1.2.3, to ease collaboration. Regardless
of location, Grid allows people, computing language, hardware and software architecture,
to join efforts towards a common goal (Gerrity, 2007). This increases the flexibility of
working outside the physical boundaries the organization.
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3.2.4 Data safety, robustness and availability
In a traditional storage regime, all access to data is lost if the server goes down. In addition,
these systems cannot withstand a simultaneous loss of more than one disk. If such a failure
occurs, the data on those disks will be lost (Patel, 2007). To prevent this, separate copies
for backup are made. Compared with ratios of 5-to-1 of backup required vs. original data,
an advanced Grid based system only requires a ratio of 1.3-to-1. The data is split into many
smaller parts, which are spread across the Grid. In addition to the reduced probability of
simultaneous failures of geographically spread computers, any lost data can be restored by
using the information from the other parts (Scheier, 2007). The lesser need for backup data,
archive handling, and disaster recovery is one of the large cost savers of the Grid. SUN
estimates that only 30% of all enterprise storage systems are used effectively (Wittmann,
2007).
The inherent property of the Grid is that it contains no single point of failure, which
could cause the whole system to collapse. If one processing unit or resource goes down, the
workload aimed at the failed unit is redirected, with little delay.
There are businesses that use Grid computing for one or more of the above-given rea-
sons; we look at some of these segments and companies in section 3.3.
3.3 Commercial Use
A report by the Gartner Group, states that Grid computing has so far reached five to 20%
of the targeted clients. Based on the classification of different technologies according to
their media exposure combined with the technology maturity, Gartner estimates that Grid
computing is 2-5 years from mainstream use (Claunch, Weiss, & McGuckin, 2007).
The Grid is an emerging technology and has therefore some challenges that have to be
worked out before it will become mainstream. The 451 Group performed a study on Grid
adoption in businesses, where one of the topics concerned difficulties. Among the biggest
issues mentioned by the industry were licensing (Dornan, 2007), cultural resistance, security
and the lack of standards (Wallage & Fellows, 2007).
3.3.1 Areas of application
The Grid is a general Information and Communication Technology (ICT) solution that can
benefit any sector. Grids are either used to offer internal or external services. It has a wide
range of application and is used in among other Banking & Finance; Insurance; Media &
Entertainment; Transport & Logistics; Manufacturing; Retail; Oil & Gas; Pharmaceutical,
as well as in the Web Industry (Gedling, 2007).
According to DataSynapse (2007), Banking& Finance is one of the largest commercial
users of Grids, where all the major financial banks and institutions are using Grids. They
are using Grids to reduce the processing time for portfolio pricing and hedging, as well as
for financial and economic modeling. According to Micheal Yoo, Head of the Technical
Council at UBS "everybody is doing the same thing; it is just about who is fast enough" "it
is a new type of arms race. . . where last year’s exotics are this year’s commodities."(Yoo,
2007).
InManufacturing, simulation of different scenarios, stress testing and design requires
a lot of computing resources. According to IBM, Airbus saved AC18 million on their A380
airliner project, by cutting lead time on the wings by 36% and eliminating re-entry of data
because of improved collaboration with suppliers and subcontractors (IBM, 2006).
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In the Pharmaceutical industry, Grids are used for computational chemistry, screening
techniques, computational fluid dynamics, and finite element analysis. The Pharmaceutical
sector was one of the first adopters of Grid computing. Today, according to Johnson &
Johnson Pharmaceutical Research & Development, all the major Pharmaceutical companies
have a Grid (Harris, 2007b). The kind of modulation the Grid offers reduces a drug’s time to
market by two years, saving $ 264 million in R&D cost, according to The Boston Consulting
Group. In addition, the patent’s market lifetime is extended by getting the product faster
through the R&D. According to GlaxoSmithKline, a new drug can sell for about two to
three million dollars a day, and one extra year in sale would be worth about $ 900 million
(Cohen, 2003).
Very significant users of Grids also include the Web Industry. Companies such as
Google, eBay, Yahoo, Amazon, and Microsoft use grid-like systems to offer advanced Web
services externally. "No single computer could update millions of auctions in real time,
as eBay does, and no one machine could track thousands of stock portfolios made up of
offerings on all the world’s exchanges, as Yahoo does" (Glider, 2006).
3.3.2 A Service Layer Business Model
We have now seen that the industry uses the Grid, we will now look at how they are using
it. There is a trend in the market towards providing different types of Grid services on an
on-demand basis. From the Hardware and Software layer point of view these services can
be defined within a Service Layer Business Model. In this business model transactions are
done between the two layers and the Users, both internally and to external organizations.
Many companies from section 3.3.1 have their Hardware and Software layers in-house to
serve the needs of their organization. We term these organizations User Integrators. We
term organizations that offer their Software layer as an external service, using their in-
house Hardware layer, Software Integrators. As well, vendors can offer the Software and
Hardware layers independently, not having the other layer. Organizations offering their
Software layer as a service provide Software-as-a-Service (SaaS). Organizations offering
their Hardware layer externally offer Hardware-as-a-Service (HaaS). Each of these vendor
models is about achieving greater economies of scale and reduction of risk than any single
company can achieve (Wardley, 2007b). These service layers are depicted in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: The layered economic service structure illustrates how Hardware-as-a-Service and
Software-as-a-Service can be offered separately or internally by Software Integrators and User Inte-
grators.
3.3.2.1 Hardware-as-a-Service
A Hardware-as-a-Service (HaaS) vendor, also called a Grid host, is someone who offers
the Hardware layer, as described in section 3.1.2.1, and sell these to other companies. They
are offering their resources on on-demand, pay-per-use basis. In the lead are large Web
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and IT companies, building supersized IT infrastructures, such as Amazon and SUN6 and
IBM (Willard et al., 2007). However, many smaller HaaS vendors are also emerging, such
as 3Tera, Layered Technologies, Media Temple and Concentric (SuperbInternet, 2007).
The buyers of these services are often Web companies envisioning themselves as the next
YouTube, MySpace, or Google, requiring scalable solutions and given immediate provi-
sioning, if they are successful. Entrepreneurs can therefore save costs when developing new
Web services by buying the hardware as service from the HaaS Vendors, instead of owning
and running their own IT infrastructure.
3.3.2.2 Software Integrators
A Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) Integrator is an organization or a company that provides
software on-demand to its clients, using for instance pay-per-use, or ad-based revenue mod-
els. Google is a one example of a Software Integrator. Their office package Google Docs
& Spreadsheets, as well as their photo editing tool Picasa, run on their own Grid and give
the application user the software he needs wherever he is. The growth of such Web services
spurred Microsoft change their business strategy to "software-AND-a-service" instead of
only "software". The service strategy is to offer advanced Web software services to con-
sumers, information workers, and IT staff (Ozzie, 2007).
3.3.2.3 User Integrators
An organization is a User Integrator if it provides all the services internally, both the Hard-
ware layer and the Software layer to its members. Most companies that run Grids today are
User Integrators, including pharmaceutical companies, and banking and finance.
Due to the growing importance of Information & Communication Technology (ICT)
in the economy and the benefits of the Grid, as mentioned in section 3.2, there is a strong
political push towards having more users run their applications on Grids.
3.3.3 Political Initiatives
The ICT is of key importance to the European Union (EU). 7% of the EU’s gross domestic
product, and half of the productivity gains in the EU’s economy are due to ICT (EU, 2006;
CORDIS, 2004). At the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 the Union set itself a new
strategic goal for 2010: ". . . to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion." (EU, 2000). To support the Lisbon Strategy the EU initiated
the "i2010" policy framework to increase its investment in ICT research by 80% (EU, 2005;
CORDIS, 2004).
The Grid plays a vital role in EU’s long term strategy of becoming the world leading
information-economy. CORDIS (2007c) states that: "Grids will become the engine of the
future knowledge-based economy and society". The EU countries therefore spent AC841
million on Grid research and deployment (EU, 2006) in 2002-2006. These, however, are
the initiatives of individual countries. The EU’s main instrument for funding scientific
research and technological development, and to meet the goals of the Lisbon Strategy, are
the Framework Programs (FPs) (CORDIS, 2007a).
6Amazon’s Simple Storage Server (S3) and Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2) Web Services offers a pay-
as-you-go service for general purpose computing at $ 0.10 an hour, while SUN offers one CPU-hour per $ 1
(Martin, 2007; Harris, 2007d).
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The European Commission’s FPs are put in place to ensure EU’s global leadership in
ICT (CORDIS, 2007b). With the framework programs from 1998 - 2006, AC280 million was
spent on Grid technology development and pilot projects. The funding is even increasing.
In the FP7 programme (2007-2013) AC9.1 billion, 64% of the total FP budget, is allocated
for ICT. The amount directly related to Grid is not yet known, but all the Grid projects
from the previous FP program continue. In addition, EU grants AC585 million for "Network
and Service infrastructures" for 2007-08, and AC600 million for an e-Infrastructure over the
entire FP7 (EU, 2007), where much of this synonymous with Grid technologies. There
are also numerous national and international Grid initiatives outside the EU7, for instance
ChinaGrid, the Japanese NAREGI, and the US TeraGrid (Gentzsch, 2007).
Where will this enormous commercial, political and technological push lead? It is a
paradigm shift from computing as a good to computing as a service, which we argue will
result in trading of computer resources, eventually leading to a professional market. In sec-
tion 3.4 we discuss the business prospects and we build a trading market for Grid resources
in chapter 4. First, we look at some requirements for such a market.
3.3.4 Technical Market Enablers
In order to have a market for trading of computer resources, two fundamental technical
factors must be in place: it must be possible to transport large amount of data over the
network, and open standards for communication between computers must be widespread.
3.3.4.1 Network Bandwidth
In the 80s, computers were expensive and large mainframes computers, accessed by thin
client terminals by a network, represented the norm. In the late 80s, the price of computing
power decreased and the network bandwidth became the bottleneck. Since then, the band-
width technology has evolved rapidly, from 56 Kbps (Kilo bits per second) in 1985 to 155
Mbps in 1997 (Ahn, Black, & Effrat, 2007). Ten years later, 1 Gbps is not unusual, and the
big laboratories communicate with a bandwidth of more than 10Gbps (DANTE, 2007), see
figure 3.4.
The increase in network bandwidth has made it more interesting to again ship the data
around so that computers no longer have to act as islands. Gilder Technology Report from
2000 states that "when the network is as fast as the computer’s internal links, the machine
disintegrates across the net into a set of special purpose appliances"(IEETA, 2003). This
is exactly what the Grid enables and what a Grid market aims to do. It then depends on
the availability of reliable high performance networking to connect the "pool" of distributed
resources. Even private households obtain higher and higher speeds on both their cable
and wireless connections, and will soon be capable of embracing all the possibilities Grid
Computing offers. In order to run Grids with success, a bandwidth of at least 20 Mbps is
needed (Casasús, 2007). This is not regarding the bandwidth that is needed to access and
use the Grid, which is easily covered with today’s ADSL connection. In addition to a well-
developed cable network, mobile networks are reaching these speeds with technologies such
as HSDPA8, HSUPA, 4G/LTE. For instance the huge telecom companies AT&T, Verizon,
and Vodafone are planning to move to 4G/LTE in 3-4 years and will be capable to offer
speeds up to 100 Mbps (A1-telecom, 2007; Electronista, 2007). Further in the future speeds
up to 380 Mbit/s can be offered with the MIMO technology (Group, 2007).
7For more Grid initiatives see EGEEs collaboration list (EGEE, 2007a).
885% of the Austrian population is already provided with 7.2 Mbit/s HSDPA networks (A1-telecom, 2007)
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Figure 3.4: The different laboratories are connected through very high bandwidth capacity, via their
National research network, in the science Grid: GÉANT2.Copyright DANTE.
Looking at history, Arpanet, a research network supported by the US Department of De-
fense’s Advanced Research Project Agency, became the backbone of the Internet (Chetty &
Buyya, 2002). Today’s global science e-Infrastructures could be the next ICT infrastructure
for society. As Arpanet was opened to the public, multi-gigabit research networks such as
GÉANT2, Internet2, TEIN2 and SEEREN2 (GÉANT2, 2007) might someday as well be
open.
However, it is not sufficient with fast network speed if the resources are unable to com-
municate with each other. Therefore, there is an industry push for open standards.
3.3.5 Open Source and Security
Mass adoption of Grid technology and data transfer between different organizations requires
open standards. We look at the analogy of the World Wide Web from CERN as a testimony
of this. According to one of the inventors of the Web, Berners-Lee (2007), the success of
this technology depended on open technical standards for growth and innovation. Without
open standards, the Web would probably not be the success it is today.
The Open Grid Forum (OGF) is an organization dedicated to developing open standards
for Grid interoperability, solving the security issues, and accelerating Grid adoption. It is a
community of users, developers, and vendors, involving more than 400 organizations from
50 countries. The members of OGF include large vendors such as Hewlett-Packard, IBM,
Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and Platform Computing (Ehrig, 2007). In addition, Google, Ama-
zon, Ebay, Facebook, MySpace and Yahoo, among others, are using open-source software9
in building their IT architectures. We see a joint effort among commercial actors to establish
9Open source software is computer software whose source code is available, under a license with relaxed or
non-existing intellectual property restrictions, that permits users to freely use, change, improve, and redistribute
the software in modified or unmodified form (TheOpenSourceInitiative, 2007).
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open standards and open source towards a common protocol for inter-Grid communication.
In addition, the network capacity and speed is moving towards the possibility of sending
huge amounts of data over large distances. We will now discuss one direction the future
ICT may take towards the construction of a commercial trading market.
3.4 Business Prospects, Supply & Demand
In this section, we look at trends and expectations on the future of Grid computing. We
see how the increase in demand of computation resources results in a bigger commercial
market. As well, outsourcing of computer services and the growth of professional actors
will probably lead to increased trading of computer resources.
3.4.1 Commercial Predictions
From a market perspective, the Grid represents a growing billion-dollar business. The
Gartner group estimates that Grid technology will enter mainstream adoption within 2010
(Claunch et al., 2007). This is supported by the Insight Research Corp., which predicts
that the worldwide Grid spending will grow from $ 714.9 million in 2005 to approximately
$ 19.2 billion in 2010 (Wellner & Weissberger, 2005). They examined Grid spending in
14 industry sectors and found that the majority of companies in the manufacturing and the
financial service industries would invest in Grid computing in near future. As mentioned
in section 3.1.2, virtualization is a technique in Grid, but it is also marketed as a separate
solution. The market for virtualization is therefore also an indicator of the Grid market. An
IDC report from July 2007 states that the market for virtualization services will grow from
$ 5.5 billion in 2006 to $ 11.7 billion in 2011 (Harris, 2007a). These market estimations are
however, based on a traditional use of Grids within an enterprise, i.e. a Work Grid. If the
benefits of the Grid are realized in other domains, such as the creation of public- and home
Grids, the adoption process would be much faster (Aubert & Solli, 2007).
3.4.2 Extreme Growth in Demand for Computing Power
Forrester Research states that while growth in IT budgets in 2007 has been stronger than ex-
pected, data center managers are still being asked to do more, even with pressure of cutting
costs. A survey from 2006 by Winter Corp. shows that the growth is fastest among very
large databases, where the biggest database was more than three times the size of the largest
reported two years earlier. This increase in computer center size is also valid for the future.
IBM projects that the world’s information base, the raw material for databases, will be dou-
bling in size every 11 hours(!) by 2010 (IBM, 2007d), however, this is not the amount of
data that will be saved. External factors, such as governmental legislation are also pushing
the need for processing. For instance, the US Food and Drug Administration is impos-
ing new quality-assurance tools, known as Process Analytical Technology, that requires the
pharmaceutical industry to dramatically increase the data collection and processing(Martin,
2007). There is therefore a dramatic increase in the processing and storage need. However,
will it be greater than the general increase in computing power?
3.4.2.1 Outgrowing Moore’s Law
It is important to emphasize that these rates of growth are unprecedented, even in the early
days of the Internet boom. Growth in computer capacity has been known for the last 40
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years to follow Moore’s Law. This "law" 10 is based on Gordon Moore’s techno-economic
observation that the number of transistors on a chip would double every two years, resulting
in a annual growth of about 42% (Martin, 2007).
SUN argues that there are two groups of companies: the ones that will grow at about
the same rate as the Gross Domestic Product, who are not outpacing Moore’s Law, and
those whose processing needs are by far outgrowing Moore’s Law. The companies that are
exceeding Moore’s law and driving exponential growth in both user demand and computing
requirements are Web companies, such as Google, YouTube, etc. as well as large financial,
energy, and pharmaceutical companies (Martin, 2007). For many organizations, computer
power will be scarce and it will be more costly to satisfy all computing needs.
3.4.3 Towards Professional Trade
One solution to the problem with too little computing power is the emergence of large pro-
fessional computer center serving multiple organizations. These centers profit from large-
scale advantages and are therefore capable of providing computing resources to a compet-
itive price as well as sustaining a near full utilization at all times. We look at the trends
towards professional providers and why organizations wish to outsource their computing
needs.
3.4.3.1 Professional Actors
"No IT staff has the time or expertise to lay out a data center for maximum efficiency"
(Wittmann, 2007). A professional actor could, however, focus on reducing operational
costs, while improving business continuity, scaling capacity to support business growth,
and improving service levels (Martin, 2007).
IDC predicts that providers delivering Grid computing will become more professional
as more customers see the benefits of buying computing power (Willard et al., 2007). The
growing professionalism for delivering computing is according to the CTO of SUN Greg
Papadopoulos a trend that boils down to efficiency at scale, i.e. real work performed versus
capital expended, power consumed, space used and the number of people needed to keep
it all working (Martin, 2007). This means that a professional provider of Grid computing
services could double the scale and reduce the marginal cost of serving a new customer,
or performing some unit of computation. As scale increases, so does efficiency, including
the opportunity of co-design of cooling and power conditioning and distribution. Gartner
Research backs up this trend of Grid-run cloud and utility computing services in a special
report from of October 2007. Their research includes the insights of more than 40 analysts
and more than 30 pieces of research. They assess 14 models for delivering IT that they say
will completely transform the IT market in the next five years. Among which, according
Wittmann (2007), the Grid is a key technology. The conclusion is according to Gartner,
that this represents an irreversible trend toward the industrialization of ICT services. They
argue that IT is progressively being delivered as a service, giving a broad impact on IT
organizations, businesses, and IT vendors. (Da Rold, Margevicius, Cohen, & Bittman,
2007).
10Some argue that this has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, or a standard, that the chip makers feel obligated
to reach to survive in the business (Ulaby, 2006).
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3.4.3.2 Outsourcing
The trend of exponential growth in demand for raw computing power is the factor that
makes outsourcing of computing interesting. SUN says that the trend is about a return to
computing as a service and a shared infrastructure. The idea is old, as mentioned in section
3.1.1, but what is new is that there is an explosion in demand, a set of technological advances
in high-speed networks, and a move towards open standards.
SUN, IBM, and Hewlett-Packard are believers of a large-scale shift to much of today’s
in-house computing loads into the Internet cloud, i.e. Grid-run cloud computing. As well,
Google, Amazon, IBM, and Microsoft are, or are planning to, offer "in-the-cloud" comput-
ing services to consumers as well as businesses (Martin, 2007; IBM, 2007b).
Ross and Westerman (2004) states that the service-provisioning model of utility com-
puting relies on Grid computing and allows the buying and selling of computing capacity.
The main benefit for buyers is that the cost of computing is based on the actual resource
use, rather than a fixed cost for capacity they only use during peak periods. IBM expects
that for most firms much of the impact of the utility model will be on the extent and na-
ture of outsourcing. By letting others take care of updating the computer farm, may allow
firms to access state of the art technologies and technical skills with reduced costs. The
on-demand capacity may allow firms of all sizes to invest less in computing capacity and
should enhance management’s ability to focus on strategic competencies.
There is a technology risk associated to Grid computing outsourcing. Firms may counter
these risks by outsourcing key infrastructure components, those most demanding of reliabil-
ity and security, to established vendors. However IBM says the growing number of vendors,
such as SUN and Amazon, reduces reliance on a single vendor, should offset some technol-
ogy risk. At the same time, outsourcing business processes and higher-level infrastructure
services may allow them to spread the technology risk of their outsourcing (Ross & West-
erman, 2004). It is probable that an internal Grid would be kept within the organization,
in order to process data of key strategic importance, in parallel with outsourcing of normal
computation. With respect to this, the development of standards is of key importance in
order to allow communication between the internal and external Grid.
There is a balance between the economics of Grid-run utility computing and the need
to control your own infrastructure11 (Martin, 2007).
Gartner estimates that most of this move towards outsourcing will be concentrated in
the next five years. A broad set of assessed delivery models, which is already used by
early adapters, will become mainstream by 2012 and making traditional models obsolete
(Da Rold et al., 2007).
3.4.4 Competition in Grid Resources Offerings
We have now seen that the large vendors and IT research & advisory firms estimate that
IT industry will shift to delivering IT as a service, using a set of Grid service provisioning
models. The companies providing these services will have to optimally manage cost fac-
tors such as space, power, cooling, maintenance, amortization of equipment and personnel
(Martin, 2007). We now look at the factors that argue for multiple computer centers, instead
of a few enormous ones.
Electricity is a key factor. A specialization of computer centers to Grid farms seems
imminent, where the large Web companies are already paving the way. However, there are
11Why run a computer center yourself?, At a talk on "Commoditisation of IT", Simon Wardley characterized
it as "Yak Shaving" (meaning no-sense) and that it is "common as chips" (in the sense that it is moving to a
point where running a data center is not a part of the core competency of a company.)(Wardley, 2007a).
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limits to how large a compute farm can become, with respect to how much electricity the
electricity-grid can supplying to one single location. It is impossible to provide an unlim-
ited amount of electricity to only one single location. According to the US Environmental
Protection Agency, data center power usage will double by 2011 (Wittmann, 2007). Gart-
ner predicts that half of the data centers in the world will not have enough electric power to
meet the computing power and cooling requirements of the high-density computing equip-
ment by the end of 2008 (Morgan, 2006). This is a physical factor to why several computer
centers must be built geographically distributed and is a factor reducing the market entry
barriers for new providers.
Cooling is a further factor. Because of cooling requirements, it might be interesting
to locate the computer centers away from the users in favorable location or even climates.
About 60% of the power consumption of a data center is attributed to cooling of compo-
nents (Morgan, 2006). Dayne Sampson, Vice President of the fastest growing search engine
Ask.com, gives an example of the electricity need for powering and cooling. He estimates
that the five leading search companies, Google, Ask, Yahoo, Microsoft, AOL, have about 2
million servers, each dissipating 300 watts of heat annually, a total of 2.4 gigawatts. This is
equivalent to half of what is needed to power the Las Vegas metropolitan area on the hottest
day of the year (Glider, 2006).
The need for computer power as well as the increasing electricity consumption has
prompted the big Web companies to start looking for places with comparative advantages
as well as specializing themselves to get a competitive edge. Optical networks, which move
data over vast distances without degradation, allow computing to migrate to wherever power
is cheapest (Glider, 2006). Looking for such comparative advantages Google is building
specialized computer farms of unprecedented proportion, using commodity components
(Farber, Dignan, & Berlind, 2007). One is being built in The Dalles, Oregon. Google
situated it near an abandoned aluminum plant and a 1.8 gigawatt power station, a source of
inexpensive electricity. In addition to electricity and cold climate, Google has access to a
640 Gbps branch of the Internet2 research network (Glider, 2006).
Another reason to believe that several companies should establish in the Grid resource
business is that profitable industries attract more actors. Macro economic theory says that
there will enter new companies in a market, given low entry barriers, as long as the price
of the service is higher than the production cost. Microsoft and Yahoo are following the
example of Google by building in Quincy and Wenatchee, Washington, where they take
advantage of rock-bottom electricity prices and un-used fiber-optics laid down during the
dot-com boom (Glider, 2006).
Governmental regulations for competition may also have an impact on increasing the
number of Grid resource vendors. If one organization gets too much force, the international
legislations will work to increase the competition and accommodate new entrance.
Based on the idea of specialization, professional actors with a dedicated computer-Grid-
center could sell computer power cheaper than non-dedicated organizations. As more and
more Grid-resource vendors emerge with the soaring growth in Grid computing provision-
ing models, it would not be efficient for organizations to have their own Grid or to cover
their complete peak computing need with an in-house Grid, unless it is of strategic impor-
tance. We argue that this as a natural consequence will result in a market place for trading
of Grid resources12. We look at how this market might be set up in chapter 4
12As Smith (1776) says "Monopoly is a great enemy to good management."
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Chapter Summary:
We have now seen that the business prospects of Grid computing is entwined with the ser-
vice delivering models such as utility and cloud computing. We have argued for the trans-
formation of computing from a good to a service and a growth in outsourcing of computer
resources to specialized computer centers.
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Summary of Part I
Chapter 2 and 3 built the foundation for a trading market for Grid resources. We began
describing one of the biggest users and developers of Grid computing, the European Orga-
nization for Nuclear Research (CERN), and its Technology Transfer policy to disseminate
technology developed at CERN for the benefit of society. In order to study the universe’s
smallest building blocks, CERN uses the world’s largest and most complex machine, the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC). When the LHC is up and running in 2008, 1 Gigabyte of
information will be retrieved from its experiments each second. Grid computing is the
technology that makes it possible to transmit, store, processed and analyzed this enormous
amount of data.
In chapter 3, we looked at what the Grid is and what it will become. Grid is a service
for sharing computer resources over a network such as the Internet, and builds on the idea
of offering computer resources as a commodity. As trends come and go, names like Cloud,
- and Utility computing, which are service provisioning models using Grid, have come
to compete with the term of Grid computing. Regardless of its denomination, the Grid
effectively decouples the computing hardware from the software. The computer hardware
resources are virtualized into a "pool" of resources, which forms a virtual Hardware layer.
This layer is then partitioned into virtual bundles of resources to support the needs of the
software, termed the Software layer. In this layer, Virtual Machines, i.e. an image of the
software on a computer, offers an environment where users can run their applications on an
on-demand basis.
Looking at the Hardware and Software layers from an economic point of view, we in-
troduce a layered service business model for the transactions between these layers. Users
might provide both the Software and Hardware layer internally, or buy one of these lay-
ers from external organizations as Hardware-as-a-Service (HaaS) or Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS). We term the users that themselves provide and use both of these service layers
themselves "User Integrators". An organization that has its own Hardware layer and sells
software services, i.e. Software-as-a-Service, is termed "Software Integrator". Vendors of
Hardware layer services offer HaaS, i.e. virtualized resources, for instance to organizations
having a Software layer, but does not have their own Hardware layer.
Most organizations using Grid today are User Integrators. The most prominent sectors
are Banking & Finance; Insurance; Media & Entertainment; Transport & Logistics; Man-
ufacturing; Retail; Oil & Gas; Pharma, and the Web Industry. They use Grid computing
to obtain resources inexpensively, improve the overall computer utilization, reduce the vul-
nerability of the system, and ease accessibility and collaboration. There also exist many
political initiatives to increase the number of companies enjoying the benefits of the Grid.
The Grid is predicted to play an important role in the IT infrastructure of tomorrow.
Exponential growth in processing needs is becoming commonplace and more and more
companies are exceeding the normal capacity development following Moore’s Law.
Once Grid computing is widespread, we envision a trading market for Grid resources.
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Advances in broadband and open standard initiatives make such a market possible. We
discussed outsourcing of computer resources to professional actors and argued that special-
ized organizations could benefit from economies of scale. In addition, electricity supply
constraints and cooling requirements will limit the size of a single computer center. This
constraint is one of the factors that open for competition amongst several Grid resource
providers. The interest of governments in competitive markets and the opportunity of profit
are two additional factors promoting multiple resource providers.
There are strong indications that there is a foundation to build a market for trading Grid
resources. We have argued for the existence of both buyers and sellers, willing to trade Grid
resources. In chapter 4 we look at how this trading could take place and in chapter 5 we lay







A central problem in globally distributed computing, and within a company, is the allo-
cation of computer resources. In the early days of mainframe computing there were few
computers and distribution was not a big issue. The users simply agreed upon the allocation
themselves, or a central manager gave different time slots of the mainframe computer to the
different projects, based on their importance. When the number of computers increased, the
central manager could not efficiently handle the increased complexity of finding the most
suitable computer to each job. Automated techniques such as the primitive Round-Robin,
where each incoming job is matched with the next available resource satisfying the job
criteria, were implemented (Gomoluch & Schroeder, 2003). These distribution techniques
resulted in an unsatisfactory allocation, as they did not take the importance of the different
jobs into account. Sutherland’s (1968) description of the bid on computer time slots at the
Harvard University is one of the first economic based approaches in distributed computing
within a single entity. Research on the use of economic based methods for intercompany
allocation started, to our knowledge, with Buyya’s (2002) thesis on Economic-based Dis-
tributed Resource Management and Scheduling for Grid Computing.
In this chapter, we look at global allocation of computer resources, in the sense that
the utility of each user is maximized. This is contrary to maximizing the utility of a set of
users with a common goal, such as one organization. The goal of this chapter is to analyze
different factors for a Grid market and, based on these factors, make a sensible choice of
market mechanism, also referred to as just "mechanism". First, we treat the market and
define factors that influence the choice of mechanism both the parties involved and the
resources traded. Second, we take a deeper look at auctions, one of the ways in which the
mechanism could be arranged. Third, we review one of the auction approaches especially
designed for Grid computing: the Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange. Although this
model takes into account most Grid aspects, we find this approach too detailed, and we
finally propose a new method: the Continuous Virtual Server Exchange, CVSE. The issue
with the latter method is that its price process may prove erratic. This problem, however,
we will solve in chapter 5 with the introduction of Grid derivatives.
4.1 Markets
The study of open trading for computer resources dates back to the work of Buyya (2002).
Before this, it was not possible to fully integrate computer resources and hence not feasible
to buy extra temporary, sufficiently large-scale computing resources for a shorter or longer
period.
For a Grid resource market to be interesting, there have to be organizations demanding
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more temporary computing resources than they already have, as well as organizations will-
ing to sell excess resources. As stated in section 3.4, computer problems increase in size
and complexity, and organizations are experiencing resource needs that are difficult to sat-
isfy. As a result, a growth in specialized computer resource providers is expected, as stated
in section 3.4. We therefore assume that computer resources are scarce and that there exist
supply and demand for these resources.
In a multi entity Grid environment, the various users and providers have different goals,
objectives and strategies. Find bilateral trading agreements may prove problematic. Markets
constitute a competitive environment that naturally balances the common and diverging
interest between parties (Tan, 2007).
Definition 2 A market is a virtual or physical meeting point of supply and demand bal-
anced by means of a mechanism. (Schnizler, 2007)
Supply consists of the price and quantity of resources that the Grid providers are offering,
while the demand is the users’ willingness to pay for the different quantities of Grid re-
sources. The market mechanism set up the rules on how to allocate and price the resources
the demanders buy from the suppliers. We now look at the agents, resources and the other
factors related to the choice of market mechanism. Based on Schnizler (2007), we make
assumptions about them as well as their requirements towards the market mechanism. Our
choice of market mechanism for the Grid market is a continuous double auction, called
CVSE, presented in section 4.4. We look at how well this mechanism satisfies the require-
ments in section 4.4.3.
4.1.1 Agents
Definition 3 An agent is one who is authorized to act for or in the place of another (Merriam-
Webster, 2007).
Since the agent represents and acts on behalf of the user, we use the word agent to describe
both software agents and the real buyers and sellers of computer resources, be it an agency,
a governmental department or a company. Mathematically: let I be the set of I agents,
where i ∈ I is an arbitrary agent.
4.1.1.1 Who Uses a Grid Trading Market?
The agents in the resource trading market consist of two groups: buyers of resources and
sellers of resources.
Referring to the service layer model, figure 4.1, the buyers of Grid resources are agents,
who provide Hardware-as-a-Service (HaaS), either internally or externally. HaaS may be an
incorporated part of the value chain of a User Integrator or integrated in the service offered
by a vendor offering Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), called Software Integrator. Some com-
panies may sell HaaS to external organizations. These Hardware layer sellers offer HaaS to
the organizations in the Software layer of the model. We define a buyer on the Grid trading
market as follows:
Definition 4 A Grid resource buyer is an agent that needs more Grid resources in his
Hardware layer in order to provide HaaS externally or internally. He is able to attach a
value to a resource, and is willing to give a financial compensation for it. Formally: let L
be the sub-set of L buyers from the set of agents, L ⊂ I, of L, then l ∈ L is a buyer of Grid
resources.
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Figure 4.1: The layered service model illustrates how Hardware-as-a-Service can be offered either
externally by vendors of HaaS, or internally to Software Integrators and User Integrators.
The sellers of resources could be computer centers of various sizes offering HaaS. We be-
lieve that it is most rational, and probable, to create a market with professional resource
providers. In section 3.4.3, we stated that specialization leads to cost efficient processing
and storage, which again leads to an outsourcing movement.
Definition 5 A seller of Grid resources is an agent who owns a resource, has a reservation
price, and is willing to trade this resource, i.e. offer HaaS, for a financial compensation.
LetM be the sub-set ofM sellers from the set of agents,M⊂ I. m ∈M is hence a Grid
resource seller.
4.1.1.2 Assumptions About the Agents
We assume that there is a high number of participants in the Grid market and approxi-
mately an equal amount of each agent type, M ≈ L >> 0. The number or buyers and
sellers is an important factor when it comes to market design, because too small a market
would have problems with the liquidity, making it difficult to buy or sell resources, while
too big a market would have interaction problems. We do not believe that it is rational to talk
about a global Grid market where all the providers and all the users are connected on one
immense Grid. Such a market would require a lot of overhead in administrating the agents,
allocating resources in a good manner as well as sending information over large distances.
Instead, we envision smaller international markets, each covering all the resource providers
and users in the countries belonging to that market. Even this market would have a high
enough number of agents, probably several hundred, to provide the necessary liquidity.
We assume that the suppliers sell resources regardless of the identity of the buyers.
The providers should be indifferent as to whether the buyers use the resources for e.g. med-
ical research, commercial or military purposes. If this would not be the case, the providers
would have done better by not participating in the market, because she is unable to control
who receives the resources (Klemperer, 1999).
The private information criteria imply that the buyer has a single valuation of the
resource based solely on her own preferences. This is opposed to common value where
the traded object has some kind of true value, but each participant knows only part of the
information regarding the object (Klemperer, 1999). The private information assumption
is reasonable, as computer resources do not have an inherent value and one consumer’s
valuation of a resource is not affected by what the others believe it is worth.
All agents should be utility maximizing. The objective for any agent is to do the best
she can in the market, i.e. to try to maximize her utility function (Nakai, 2002). We also
assume that the agents are greedy1 meaning they prefer more to less.
1"Greed is good" - Gordon Gekko, "Wall Street" (1987).
34 CHAPTER 4. EXCHANGE MARKET
4.1.1.3 Requirements of the Agents to the Mechanism
The agents bring with them certain requirements that a market mechanism must satisfy.
First of all, taking part in the market must not be a burden. The allocation must be both
economical and allocation efficient, the market should reveal the agents’ true preferences,
and no one should be required to subsidize the market mechanism. We will discuss these
requirements one by one.
Individual rationality says that the utility of the participants in the market should be
equal or greater than if they did not participate. This should be true for both the resource
users and the providers. If the mechanism does not support individual rationality, the market
would not be viable as the number of users could be very low. For an agent to be interested
in participating in a Grid market, it has to be economically efficient. Grid market design is
therefore paramount (Tan, 2007; Schnizler, 2007; Nicolaisen, Petrov, & Tesfatsion, 2001;
Miller & Drexler, 1988c, 1988b, 1988a; Buyya, 2002). Without an efficient market, the par-
ticipants would get their computing resources elsewhere (Weng, Li, & Lu, 2007). Efficiency
is the ability of the market to allocate the resources from the providers who offer them at
the lowest price to the ones who value it the most, hence maximizing the total value over
all agents. In order to have an efficient market, the mechanism must be incentive compati-
ble. A mechanism is incentive compatible if, regardless of what others do, the agents show
their true preferences, i.e. the strategy that maximizes their expected utility. If the market
mechanism does not receive true signals from the agents, it cannot allocate the resources
efficiently.
Several factors affect the utility of a market participant: the price, allocated resources, as
well as the speed of getting the resources. The time taken from a need arises to its fulfillment
is an important concept in Grid allocation, called scheduling efficiency. The value for the
customer of a resource decreases with the length of the allocation time, from a maximum
at immediate allocation, to zero when the allocation time reaches the minimum acceptable







Figure 4.2: Illustration of the utility of a market participant.
if it is a closed economy, i.e. if all money paid in to the mechanism from the buyers is
redistributed to the resource sellers. Breaking this requirement means that someone from
the outside has to fund a part of the allocation, or that the mechanism requires money from
the agents.
4.1.2 Resources to be Traded
Many computational jobs involve the use of different resources such as applications, servers,
clusters, processing units, storage, memory, networks, sensors, and other instruments. Many
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academics have debated what the most suitable trading unit for a Grid market would be.
For instance, some follow a physical resource approach where each resource is traded sepa-
rately (Weng et al., 2007), while others see the traded objects as elementary services where
bundles of resources are sold (Schnizler, 2007). We agree that a bundling approach is the
most appropriate in a Grid market. Such an approach prevents obtaining only a single re-
source, for example memory, and not the processing power. Figure 4.3 depicts the resource
providers bundling basic resource into a greater logical unit.
Figure 4.3: Physical resources are bundled into greater logical units.
4.1.2.1 Resource Factors that Determine the Market
The kind of resource traded greatly influences the agents’ valuation. If the price is the only
factor determining the value for the agents, the resource is said to have a single attribute.
A resource is multi-attributed if other attributes, such as hardware limitations, also affect
the agents’ preferences. If an agent considers two Grid resource services to be equivalent,
they are then characterized as homogeneous (Schnizler, 2007). The basic resources are
relatively heterogeneous, for instance memory systems differ in attributes, such as size,
latency, reliability, transfer rate, structure, access time, security and storage cost (Miller &
Drexler, 1988c, 1988b, 1988a). The Grid middleware may aggregate and emulate basic
resources to make up for some of the heterogeneity, such as size, by making them virtual.
We treat different resource bundling approaches in section 4.3 and 4.4. In the first
section we accept that the Grid resources are heterogeneous and multi attributed. We find
that this approach gives too many possibilities, making it difficult to allocate the resources.
In the latter part, we reduce the alternatives and trade only in homogeneous, single attributed
resources, Virtual Servers.
4.1.2.2 Requirements of the Resources to the Market Mechanism
In this section we will provide some of the most important requirements on the resources in
a Grid trading market. These expectations state that the market mechanism must support a
great variety of resource configurations in order to be fully functional.
It should support heterogeneous resources, as well as provide support for different
resource specifications. This means that the market ought to offer functionalities for pro-
viding, for instance, both storage and computation with different qualities in for example
the storage size and clock frequency.
The mechanism must support simultaneous allocation of multiple resources in the form
of bundles, because the allocation of one type of resource may be worthless without another
type of resource. For example, a computational unit without storage might be of no use for a
customer. Co-Allocation of resources requires that it is possible to acquire resources from
different providers in the best way possible, e.g. from the geographically closest providers.
The requirement of substitutability of resources demands that the mechanism only
allocate one bundle of substitutable resources to an agent. A consumer might be indifferent
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of having one CPU running for four hours or four CPUs running for one hour, however, he
would only like to utilize one of these options (Schnizler, 2007).
4.1.3 Other Factors for Choice of Market Mechanism
There are other factors, besides the agents and resources, which are important for the choice
of market mechanism. We make assumptions regarding the market and give some require-
ments that it must support.
4.1.3.1 Assumptions on these Other Factors
Because the different companies have different usage-patterns of computer power, it must
be possible to trade Grid resource services both day and night. The consumption being
continuous and the computer resources non-storable, a pause in the trading means that the
buyers would have to wait for the trading to start again, or for them to acquire their resources
elsewhere. As the providers would not be able to sell during shut down periods either, the
potential traded quantity in the market would be severely reduced. We therefore assume
that the market is open around the clock, and will neither have start-up, nor end prices.
We also assume that a job can be paused and resumed later. This assumption prevents
lock-in of jobs that take longer than expected. An agent might initiate to buy computer re-
sources when she finds it appropriate and does not have to be afraid of potential subsequent
price growth. If the job is not of high importance, she could wait for the prices to decrease,
to continue the computation.
4.1.3.2 Further Requirements for the Mechanism
The computational tractability requirement demands that the mechanism calculate the
winner and determine the price within a reasonable period (Schnizler, 2007). This means
that the agents’ tolerance limit of allocation time determines the maximum time the allo-
cation process can take. Schnizler (2007) requires automated resource allocation, stating
that no manual allocation should be necessary to match provider and demander. He also says
that the mechanism must allow resource owners to announce their resources, and resource
requesters to discover them. He calls this the requirements of a double-sided mechanism.
A consumer must be guaranteed resource usage time. This means that a user must be
able to receive resources for the duration he desires. Schnizler (2007) says that the users
should also be able to state in advance which time slots they would like to use and that
the mechanism should support providers expressing their future resource offer. Advanced
reservation of resource is a requirement supporting these plans of resource consumption
and announcement.
Network quality is also a requirement that the allocation mechanism must consider,
according to Schnizler. The mechanism must be able to take the given network bandwidth
into account when allocating resources.
The problem is to find a market model and mechanism that support all of the require-
ments from the agents, resources and the other factors. There exists a variety of different
market models, including fixed-price models, dynamic-price markets, and auctions, for de-
tails, see Buyya, Abramson, and Giddy (2000) and Buyya (2002). In an auction market, the
prices are set dynamically in a decentralized manner. We prefer the auction model to the
dynamic-price market because of the decentralized aspect, that is, the buyers and sellers in
the market and not a central allocator determine the traded quantity and price (Vytelingum,
2006).
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We summarize these factors, assumptions, and their requirements to the mechanism, in
the table below
Factor What/Who Assumptions Requirements to
the market mechanism
Agents Buyers: High number of participants, Individual rationality,
Internal or Equally many buyers and sellers, Economical efficiency,
external Do not care with whom they trade, Scheduling efficiency,
providers of HaaS. Valuation based on Budget-balanced.
Sellers: private information,
Resource owners. Utility maximizers.
Resources Computer Heterogeneous resources might be Support of
resources. virtualized to be more homogeneous, heterogeneous resources,
Might be single Bundle approach,
or multi attributed. Co-Allocation,
Resource substitutability.
Other Factors Time, Trading both day and night, Computational tractability,
Allocation Jobs can be paused and resumed. Automated resource
Complexity, allocation,
Jobs, Double-sided mechanism,
Set-up of Guaranteed resource
the mechanism. usage time,
Advanced reservation.
4.2 Auction Theory
In this thesis, we take a closer look at auction models to allocate Grid resources. This type
of market model is well defined and provides a valuable testing ground for economic theory.
In addition, it has enjoyeda long experience period within both research and practice.
Definition 6 AGrid auction is a mechanism, organized by an auctioneer, to distribute Grid
resource services from the sellers to the buyers. The mechanism consists of determining the
winner and setting the price.
There are two main kinds of auctions: single-sided and double-sided. In single-sided auc-
tions, many consumers bid on Grid resources from one provider, or many providers submit
ask prices to one consumer for delivery of a resource. Single-sided auctions attain approx-
imate economically efficient outcomes if it is a one-to-many or many-to-one relationship
between the demanders and suppliers. This does not stick if there are multiple buyers and
multiple sellers trading the same type of resource. The single-sided auction would then lead
to inefficient allocation (Schnizler, 2007).
Auctions based on a double-sided mechanism allow multiple consumers to place bids
on a resource in parallel with many providers submitting asks on the same resource. As the
Grid market consists of multiple buyers and sellers, double-sided auctions, or exchanges
for short, give results that are more economically efficient than its alternatives. In fact,
there exists no other known trading system, where there are sufficiently many buyers and
sellers, in which the agents would be better off in expectation, than in double-sided auctions
(Klemperer, 1999).
4.2.1 Double-Sided Auction
The double-sided auctions treat the buyers and sellers symmetrically, letting buyers submit
bids and sellers ask, see figure 4.4. The exchange might be arranged in different ways,
either by letting the agents combine to a bundle different basic resources themselves, called








Figure 4.4: Figure showing the bids and asks from the agents, as well as the flow of money and
resources in a double sided auction.
a combinatorial auction, or aggregate the resources before selling them, that is a single item
auction.
Combinatorial double-sided auction is the simultaneous exchange of heterogeneous
resources. It allows the buyer to specify the exact combinations of resources that maximizes
his utility. The providers submit their asks on single Grid resource services and the auc-
tioneer solves the possibly computationally demanding optimization problem of allocation.
Section 4.3 gives a larger example of a combinatorial exchange, called a Multi-Attribute
Combinatorial Exchange.
The single item exchange is a double-sided auction where the agents trade only ho-
mogeneous resources. Each consumer bids on one or many units of the resource and each
provider states the quantity as well as the price for the resources he would like to sell. The
auctioneer couples the overlapping bids and asks, distributes the resources and sets prices
according to the auction’s allocation- and pricing mechanism. In section 4.4, a single item
exchange for allocating a single Grid resource, Virtual Servers, is further developed.
4.3 Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange
The Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange (MACE) is a market method for Grid re-
sources proposed by Schnizler (2007). He considers a Grid market where the resource
buyers specify, in detail, the resources they would like to buy. This whole section is based
at the work of Schnizler (2007). We first look at how Schnizler describes the problem of
how to allocate and price the resources, and then state how well the MACE conforms to the
requirements set by the Grid market.
4.3.1 MACE Problem Description
In the Grid market, there are several discrete resources. Let Xj be a bundle consisting of
one or more of these basic resources, for example it may consist of storage and memory.
MACE assumes heterogeneous resources containing multi-attributes, meaning that the price
is not the only factor determining the agents’ valuation.
The mechanism allows the buyers to specify each quality requirement individually, for
instance that the speed of the CPU in a certain bundle should be greater than 1 GFLOPS. A
seller in MACE is able to specify the maximum offered quality characteristics.
MACE allows further specification of the time related to resource use. Each allocation
period, let us say one day, is divided into discrete time slots. A buyer may wish to have
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a certain resource bundle over a time span of a certain number of time slots, while also
specifying an earliest allocation time and an interval for the resource need. For instance,
if the day is divided into 24 periods, he could request resource allocation of a total of 5
periods, with the earliest time at noon and the latest at eight o’clock. The seller makes a
similar decision, but states only the starting and ending hour of the periods during which
he offers a resource bundle. A buyer l ∈ L expresses his maximum valuation, vl of each
bundleXj . One seller,m, may be able to provide a certain part of the bundle, be it whole or
only a fraction. Let vm be the reservation price, that is, smallest amount a seller is willing
to sell a bundle of resources Xj during one such time slot. There might be a difference
between the value an agent attaches to the bundle and the price he offers or requests for it.
The ask price am of a seller m for a resource is a result of the qualities and attributes, the
start and end times, as well as the seller’s true reservation price. The bid price bl of a buyer
also takes into account the composition of the bundle and the total period during which he
would like to use it. In addition, when giving a bid, the buyer must specify the maximum
number of co-allocations in each time slot. Buyers are not interested in having multiple
bundles allocated to them when they only need one, hence they have to express possible
substitutions among the bids.
There is quite a lot of information with which each seller and buyer must provide the
exchange in order for it to allocate the resources in a proper manner. In most cases, computer
programs specify all these factors and give an ask or a bid price. All these possibilities of
specifications make it very hard for the allocation and pricing mechanism to decide on the
winners. We describe the allocation and pricing in the MACE in section 4.3.2.
4.3.2 Allocation Determination and Pricing in MACE
We will not go into details of how MACE allocates resources, but simply give a brief
overview of the allocation method. We refer the interested reader to Schnizler (2007).
MACE allocate resources by solving the optimizing problem of maximizing the differ-
ence between the buyers’ total bids subtracted by the sum of the ask prices when each
period, bundle, buyer and seller are considered. The constraints to this maximizing prob-
lem includes that each buyer l ∈ L can only be allocated one bundle Xj , and that each
allocated bundle Xj is allocated within the total time defined by the buyer l. Each buyer
can get a bundle from multiple sellers, and a seller can only sell a bundle to one customer.
Other constraints include technicalities in relation to the earliest and latest allocation times,
interdependencies among the Grid resources, as well as quality characteristics. This op-
timization problem is quite hard to solve and is the biggest drawback with MACE. The
MACE allocation mechanism can be reduced to the known Non-deterministic Polynomial
time (NP)-complete Capacity Allocation Problem (CAP), which means that the winner de-
termination problem in MACE is also NP-complete. By assuming that the complexity class
which can be solved in polynomial time (P) is different from the complexity class NP, the
NP-complete problems cannot be solved in polynomial time with increasing input size2.
The input size in a Grid context is the number of agents providing bids and asks. With
a possibly huge number of bidders and askers, who are allowed to specify the resources,
attributes, start, stop and total run time, an immense number of bundles is created. The
determination of the winner would then take incredibly long3.
Once MACE has solved the allocation problem, the pricing of the bundles is a much
simpler task. The bundles that the agents trade are heterogeneous, and the auctioneer must
2Let n be the problem size. If the problem can be solved in a time that is a polynomial expression of n, for
example n4 + 2n2, then the problem complexity is polynomial
3It is probable that a very big Grid must be installed to cope with such processing requirements.
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set the discriminatory price. MACE uses k-pricing, where the price that a buyer has to pay
is somewhere between his bid and the combined sellers’ asks. As the winning bids and
asks are seldom the same, their difference creates an aggregation surplus, β. A factor k
decides how much each part should receive from the surplus. The surplus and the resources






Figure 4.5: Figure showing the surplus and how the resources are allocated. kβ is allocated to the
bidder and (1− k)β to the seller.
4.3.3 Analysis of MACE
The biggest problem with MACE, among the requirements set by the agents, resources or
other factors, is the computational tractability. As MACE is NP-complete, the calculation
of the allocation would possibly take very long. This delay would also negatively affect
the scheduling efficiency, since the users would not receive the resources immediately. The
second biggest problem is that MACE does not satisfy the demand of economical efficiency.
Schnizler’s (2007) theorem 5.4, page 105, declares that MACE is "budget-balanced and
individually rational," and from the impossibility theorems 4 We know that MACE is not
economically efficient. More exactly, the incentive compatibility, which is necessary to
have an efficient market, does not apply to MACE. This is because it would be better for an
agent to provide a bid or ask price that differs from her true valuation or reservation price.
The other requirements, however, are mostly satisfied. We will now present our alternative
auction model to the MACE, called CVSE.
4.4 Continuous Virtual Server Exchange
We propose a Continuous Virtual Server Exchange (CVSE) together with a special supple-
mentary resource market. The idea is that a Grid market consists of the combination of
a large-scale homogeneous resources exchange with a supporting over-the-counter (OTC)
market for exceptional resources. We find that these exchanges do not suffer from the major
fault of MACE, the problem of computational tractability. However, by having a continuous
market, we introduce the risk of severe price movements. How we may mend these risks is
the topic of chapter 5 "Derivatives Market".
4.4.1 Factors
The most important factors that define the CVSE and the OTCmarkets are agents, resources
and time. These two markets have different purposes and handle these factors differently.
4The impossibility theorems of Myerson and Satterthwaite, and Hurwicz Green and Laffont describes that
it is impossible to design an exchange that is economically efficient, budget-balanced and individually rational.
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While the agents are the same as in MACE, we provide an entirely different approach to
what resources are traded, and the duration of the use of resources.
4.4.1.1 Agents
The agents on this market are approximately the same as in MACE. A buyer of resources,
l ∈ L, would most likely be one of the following, cf. section 4.1.1.1 : a vendor of Hardware-
as-a-Service (HaaS), Software Integrators or User Integrators.
A resource provider, m ∈ M , could sell homogeneous resources at the CVSE and/or
special resources at the OTC market. A seller can participate on the OTC market if he has
resources that are considerably better than the standardized resources, or if the resources
have a kind of special feature. The only requirement for a seller to participate at the CVSE
market is that he provide at least one CVSE resource, called Virtual Server.
4.4.1.2 Resources
Instead of letting each agent specify freely all the resources they would like to have, the
CVSE limits the choices to a few standard Virtual Servers. A Virtual Server (VS) is a func-
tional bundle aggregated from geographically separated basic resources, or as a partition
from a larger resource, cf. 3.1.2.1. In this manner, a supercomputer could be split into mul-
tiple VSs of a certain specification, or numerous smaller resources could be joined to one
VS with the same specification. A typical VS consists of storage, processing unit, memory,
and communication possibilities. Knowing that it is difficult to find a VS that fits all par-
ticipants’ needs, we suggest trading multiple grades in the CVSE market. For instance, we
may have the grades: superior, normal, and inferior. The difference between these groups
could, for example, be the design of the resources or the way the different resources are
connected. A high-grade classification could require that all the basic resources be situated
at the same geographical location. We do not state any specific resource requirements for
the different states, but simply state that the different grades should reflect the prevailing
opinion, at each point in time, of what the different grades represent. They should thus be
dynamic categories reflecting the technological evolution.
Similarly to what was mentioned in section 3.1.2.2 in terms of resources, a set of Virtual
Servers can function as the Hardware layer in a Grid, supporting the Software layer. This
means that the owner of the Software layer buys the Hardware layer as Hardware-as-a-
Service. VSs can also be added and included in the Hardware layer of a Grid, providing the
buyer with more computer resources.
Definition 7 A Virtual Server is a bundle of physical resources provided as a service
through a network, giving a functioning computing environment of a certain size. Let Xj
represent a Virtual Server which offers at least the minimum requirements of a certain grade
j = {superior, normal, inferior}.
We design the CVSE market to handle a large quantity exchange of resources, and the OTC
market to supplement it. In the OTC market, it is possible to buy resources that are highly
heterogeneous and specialized, in order to add more storage or computer power to the VSs.
The OTC might also open for trade of telescopes and other sensors, in order to increase the
span of resources available to the buyers. Figure 4.6 depicts how the agents interact with
the market mechanism in the exchange of Virtual Servers.




Figure 4.6: Figure showing how the sellers place ask price for Virtual Servers on the market, while
the HaaS layer places bids on these resources. After the allocation is complete, money flows from
the buyers to the sellers, while VSs go in the opposite direction.
4.4.1.3 Time
The Grid market needs to determine the duration in which the buyer has the resources at his
disposal. The CVSEmarket standardizes this period in order to have perfectly homogeneous
resources. The problem is then to find the right time slot. Too short a period will cause the
overhead of sending jobs back and forth between the Virtual Servers to be immense. Too
long a time slot would result in resource inefficiency, as a user must be certain to have need
for the VS during the whole interval. In this thesis, we use one hour as a period whenever
we need to state explicitly the duration. We do not claim that this is the correct length, we
only emphasize that one single suitable duration must be found in such an exchange market.
Again, we still assume that a job can be stopped and resumed at leisure. The agents might
therefore have the resources during one half hour, and then pause before starting the job
again, without any troubles.
In the OTC market, however, this duration limit should not exist. In this market, the
resources should have a time length equal to the buyers’ specifications. Here, the users
should be able to buy storage for longer or shorter periods than one hour.
4.4.2 How the Trading is Done
In order give a complete overview of the exchange market, we also briefly treat the OTC. A
similar process to MACE would probably solve the OTC allocation with great success. The
only things that are different from the discussion under section 4.3 are the number of par-
ticipants and bundling. In this market, as the trading consists of only single heterogeneous
resources, there is no need for a bundle approach. It is not difficult to incorporate this in the
MACE framework and we rely on this exchange for the OTC resources. In the OTC mar-
ket, there are few agents, as the CVSE market is handling the gross volumes. Hence, there
are fewer problem instances in the OCT optimizing problem compared to the full MACE
market, and the time for the OTC auctioneer to find the optimal allocation would be much
shorter.
There are several aspects to consider when designing a market mechanism for CVSE,
and one single decision may affect the fulfillment of the requirements. One such crossroads
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is the decision of the allocation frequency.
4.4.2.1 Continuous Allocation and Pricing
An auction may allocate resources in two different ways depending on how long the auction
should be open to match buyers and sellers. The Grid market can match the agents either
periodically or continuously.
In periodic allocation, the auctioneer collects bids and asks during a fixed period and
sorts them in increasing and decreasing order, respectively. He then matches the quantity of
VSs desired by the highest bid with the quantity provided by the lowest ask(s). This process
is repeated until there exist no bids that are higher than the remaining ask prices, and there,
the price is set. Figure 4.7 depicts the determination of the winner and the price setting.
The bidding-round ends with the auctioneer clearing the market, that is, invalidating the








Figure 4.7: The auctioneer collects the bids and asks during a period, ranks them and finds the
mechanism price, p∗ and quantity, q∗.
There are several other problems with the periodic clearing approach. Uncertainty
amongst the participants is one of them. The agents will not know, until the end of the
period, if they were one of the winners. Thus, they cannot respond quickly to the changes
in supply and demand (Tan, 2007). In addition, the allocation time is very long, making the
mechanism scheduling inefficient because the allocation does not happen when the users
need the Virtual Servers.
The continuous allocationmethod lets the allocation period approach zero. This means
that the auctioneer allocates the VSs as soon as there exists a match between a bid and an
ask.
Definition 8 We define Continuous allocation as follows: during a short period [t, t+ dt〉,
maximum one agent can enter the auction.
At any given time, the auctioneer keeps two queues, consisting of unallocated bids and asks,
for each VS grade. A gap between the best bid and the best ask, i.e. the highest bid bmax,
and the lowest ask, amin, constitutes the bid-ask spread. A buyer thus has two choices: give
a buy order, meaning a bid that is higher than the current amin, or she could give a book
order, that is, a bid that is not as high as the amin. Only in the first case is an immediate
allocation effectuated with a price of at least amin. For the seller, her sell and book orders
are symmetric to the ones of the buyer. This process is depicted in figure 4.8. At each point
in time t when the auctioneer effectuates a buy, or a sell order, the resulting price, let us call
it St, becomes the market price.
With such short time slots, the market mechanism cannot provide economical efficiency
as it has problems with allocating the resources from the sellers with the lowest global
reservation price to the buyers with the highest value. It has been shown, however, that







Figure 4.8: The auctioneer’s book depicts the bid-ask spread, at time t. If a buy-order of a quantity
enters, it is matched with the first seller(s) in the queue.
the continuous allocation typically converges to the competition equilibrium (Tan, 2007).
In this equilibrium, the allocator is fully aware of the supply and demand curves of each
participant, and can create economic efficient allocation. This convergence is not certain as
the continuous model may also create large price fluctuations.
The main benefit of this approach, compared to the periodic allocation, is the immediate
allocation, that is, once a match occurs, the resource transmission process starts. We agree
with Tan (2007) that immediate allocation is fundamental for the flexibility of the Grid. We
choose the continuous allocation method for the CVSE model and discuss shortcomings as
well as other aspects of this model further in this chapter.
4.4.3 Analysis of CVSE
MACE’s biggest problem is the computational tractability. This is, in CVSE, no longer
an issue, as the continuous resource allocation problem could be solved in polynomial time.
In fact, the worst case scenario would give a complexity of O (n lg(n))5, where n is the
problem size, as derived in appendix B. The most important thing, though, is that the
problem is not NP-complete, as was the case with MACE. The auctioneer has a very simple
problem to solve. Let us say that a buyer of resources has entered a bid. The auctioneer
needs only to see if this bid is lower than the maximum of the asks, amax and, if so, find
the price and allocate the resources. Since CVSE does not need to solve an optimization
problem, the allocation is solved momentarily each time an agent poses a bid or an ask. This
immediate allocation is also an important factor for the scheduling efficiency requirement.
By continuous matching of suppliers and demanders, the user receives the resources when
he has the most use for them. He does not have to wait for an allocation period to be
terminated, or for the auctioneer to announce the winner, in order to get the resources.
The agents’ requirement of economic efficiency was not fulfilled in the MACE ap-
proach, nor is it not met in the CVSE market. Again, the different agents do not have the
incentive to reveal their true valuation and reservation prices, as they may do better by
bluffing. Numerous experimental and laboratory experiments have shown that, in many
cases, the quantity and the price converge nonetheless towards the competition equilibrium.
Still, there are no guarantees for convergence, and as high volatility in the prices may occur
because of continuous trading, the price and quantity might not converge at all, causing
inefficient allocation to take place (Tan, 2007).
In theory, the CVSE market can be budget-balanced, that is, that all payments from the
agents are redistributed among the agents, cf. chapter 4.1.1.3. In the real world, however,
the auctioneer and the other facilitators of the exchange must also somehow make money. A
5O (n lg(n)) the problem solving time does not increase with more than (n lg(n)), with increasing problem
size n
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weaker form of the budget-balanced property is more likely to be implemented in the Grid
market, that is, that net payments are made from the agents to the mechanism, but no net
payments go the other way (Schnizler, 2007).
The net payment to the auctioneer could conflict with the individually rational require-
ment. In order for the mechanism to be individually rational, the utility of participating for
the agents should be equal or greater than not participating. If all participants have to con-
tribute to the mechanism, then the non-winning participants will do better to refrain from
participating. Instead of relying on the weaker form of the "individually rational" crite-
rion, which states that the expected utility should be equal or greater than standing outside
the mechanism, we solve the problem in a different way. We keep the participation in the
CVSE free, but let the winners of the exchange pay transaction fees to the mechanism. This
would reduce the winners’ allocation surplus, but the individually rational criteria would
presumably be fully satisfied. At the CVSE, only single attributed, homogeneous Virtual
Servers are traded. The CVSE market alone does not meet the resource requirement of het-
erogeneous resources with different attributes. VSs merged with special resources, from
the OTC market, create tailored resource bundles to fit the users’ needs perfectly. It is im-
portant to state again that the special resource market only supplements the CVSE market.
CVSE is much bigger, both in throughput and in market size, than the OTC market.
In the CVSE market, a customer is allowed to co-allocate VSs from many different
providers, in order to create an even larger Virtual Server. The buyer is ensured that he only
receives one of the desired resource combinations. Because the allocation is happening
continuously, he knows immediately if he has been allocated resources. If the user also
needs special resources, he would wisely buy these first, as he can reserve resources in the
OTC. When he is certain about his allocation outcome, the buyer is free to buy the Virtual
Servers on the CVSE.
A buyer can always buy Virtual Servers, given available capacity, by posing a high
enough bid in the market, hence, the CVSE meets the requirement of guaranteed usage
time. Both buyers and sellers can pose their bids and asks in CVSE, as is the requisite of
a double-sided mechanism. The mechanism does not consider dynamic network quality,
but relies only on static values, so we say that CVSE only partially fulfils the network quality
requirement.
We believe that most of the requirements posed by the agents, resources and the other
factors are mostly satisfied and that there are no major obstacles to creating the Continuous
Virtual Server Exchange. The biggest problem, however, is that a continuous market might
create huge price oscillations. These price dynamics are the topic of section 4.4.4 and we
present a method to create predictability of future prices in chapter 5.
4.4.4 Price Dynamics
In a Grid market, there would be several factors driving the prices of the traded resources.
Supply and demand are, of course, two factors determining the price, but there are also
other forces affecting the prices. We separate between the market specific forces, due to the
arrangement of the market, and external factors that only indirectly affects the prices.
4.4.4.1 Market Specific Forces
New agents entering the market may affect the prices in both directions. The number of
suppliers may increase because different companies see that money can be made in the
market. Macro economic theory says that as long as the prices are superior to the cost of
producing the good, more and more companies will enter the market to offer their services.
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This means that when the number of sellers increases, the prices decline. The opposite
happens when there are new demanders entering, something that often occurs when the
market is in the initial period. When companies notice that a Grid market offers flexibility,
cost reduction etc, new buyers will enter. The big changes in the prices, due to internal
factors, would probably happen because of agents already in the market. In a continuous
market, there are always losers that have not been able to sell or buy computer resources.
The "loosing" producers might consider reducing their ask price in order to sell resources,
while the companies that have not been able to buy resources might consider increasing
their bids.
4.4.4.2 External Factors
External factors are the price drivers that are outside the control of the agents in the market,
affecting the agents’ bid and ask strategies.
Increases in the electrical power prices would directly affect the producers, as the cost
of computing would be higher. In fact, the price of a VS should, in the long term, be
higher than the price of the electricity the VS uses, including both cooling and direct power
consumption. Otherwise, the sellers would have a guaranteed loss on their VS sales.
Technological development would cause a price reduction of the VSs. Indeed, devel-
opment would most certainly reduce the price of performing a same number of calculations.
Such progress would lead to a revaluation of the specifications of the VS grades, and hence
alter the prices of the different grades.
Macro economic factors could also affect the Virtual Server prices. Inflation, alteration
in the foreign exchange, as well as changes in the nations’ taxation policies would most
certainly affect the Grid resource prices in either direction. A destruction of companies
involved in trading may also be one direct external factor that would drive the prices in either
direction. Natural or economical disaster and war are perhaps among the most devastating
factors destroying companies, both on the supplying and the demanding side.
All these factors affecting the price lead to the conclusion that a computer resource mar-
ket could be highly stochastic. Especially with the use of continuous market mechanisms, as
CVSE is, the resulting prices could be very volatile. Price fluctuation creates problems for
both sides of the agents in the market. The buyers do not have control over the possible cost
incurred by computing in the future and the sellers cannot have long planning horizons for
their income. Both sellers and buyers have financial risk and need a way to master this risk.
In chapter 5, we present such a financial risk management instrument, namely derivatives.
Chapter Summary:
This chapter has treated the subject of creating a market on Grid resources. We looked at
the potential agents in this market, both buyers and sellers, and provided their requirements
towards the market mechanism. We also discussed the potential traded resources and other
factors influencing this market. We found that a double-sided auction would be a good
market mechanism and we looked at MACE and CVSE, two different exchanges. The
properties of the MACE and CVSE are summarized below:
CVSE MACE
Resources Standardized single-attributed VS Multi-attributed resources
Allocation Mechanism Single item Combinatorial
Allocation Time Immediate Possibly long duration
Pricing Mechanism buy & sell orders k-pricing
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As MACE has big problem with the processing needed for the allocation problem, we pro-
posed the polynomial-time CVSE, a single item homogeneous continuous exchange. By
analyzing the CVSE with respect to the mechanism requirements, we found that it satisfies
most of them. CVSE’s biggest problem, however, is the possibility of erratic and volatile
price movements, both due to modeling and external factors. In chapter 5 we propose a
derivatives market in order to create predictability.
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Chapter 5
Derivatives Market
In this chapter, we propose Grid derivatives as a means of risk management. In addition to
their ability to create a predictable future, derivatives are frequently used as instruments of
speculation. First, we introduce the Grid swap. This instrument is dependent on the Virtual
Server price process and creates the link between the spot market and the other deriva-
tives. Second, we establish the theoretic framework for pricing and hedging the swap-based
derivatives. Finally, we evaluate the viability of the derivatives market on Grid computing.
5.1 Grid Derivatives
We have now proposed a model for a Grid exchange market based on the concept of com-
moditization of computer resources. The traded asset is a Virtual Server (VS), X , with
grade j, and price process St,
St : price of the Virtual ServerXj , at time t
with j = {superior, normal, inferior} . (5.1)
As argued in chapter 4 "Exchange Market", the balancing of demand and supply, as well as
the special physical attributes of computer resources such as non-storability, create uncer-
tainty about the VS prices. This unpredictability represents a danger of price movements
that negatively affect the agents. The spot prices, St, might depict erratic and extreme
movements and thereby impose a significant risk if the agents trade solely at the Continu-
ous Virtual Server Exchange, CVSE.
. . . risk by its nature has carried, and always will carry with it, the possi-
bility of adverse outcomes. Accordingly, for globalization to continue to foster
expanding living standards, risk must be managed ever more effectively as the
century unfolds. (Greenspan, 2002).
5.1.1 Financial Risk Management
Risk management includes activities dealing with recognition, assessment, management,
and mitigation of risks. Strategies for risk management include transferring the risk to
another party, avoiding the risk, reducing the negative effect of the risk, and accepting some
or all of the consequences of a particular risk (Crockford, 1986). In our approach to a spot
market, we introduce the CVSE for computer time and resource allocation. By doing so,
we introduce a price risk because the agents do not know the future prices beforehand. To
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mitigate this risk and enable future reservation of the computer resources, we suggest a
financial market where it is possible to buy and sell risks.
There have been hints of the use of financial risk management in computer sciences, see
for example Smith, Foster, and Taylor (2000), Sulistio and Buyya (2004) and Darlington
and Newhouse (2006), but to the best of our knowledge, no one has yet systematically
treated the subject of international trading. Most of the scientific effort on computer risk
management, or advanced future scheduling, has focused on management within a single
company. We aim at building an international place to trade the financial risks connected
with computer resource trading: a derivatives market.
5.1.1.1 Derivatives History
In finance, the agents manage risk by trading financial instruments or contracts, i.e. termed
derivatives. The agents could vanquish all risk if they were able to forecast the future prices
correctly. Such a precision forecast being highly unlikely, complete elimination of risk
seems impossible. The solution is therefore to spread the risk. Lessons learned from finan-
cial markets suggest that financial derivatives, when well understood and properly utilized,
are beneficial to the sharing and controlling of undesired risk. Uncontrolled exposure to
market price risks could lead to devastating consequences for the Grid market participants,
as was the case in the early electricity derivatives market. If the risks are properly dispersed,
shocks to the overall economic system are better absorbed and less likely to create cascading
failures that could threaten financial stability (Greenspan, 2002). In section 5.2, we intro-
duce the Grid swap as a financial instrument for the agents to have complete knowledge of
the price to pay or receive for the future Virtual Server use.
Economic risk has been managed using derivatives contracts for thousands of years,
evolving from securing harvest payments described in the Code of Hammurabi in 1800 BC
(Embrecht, 2003), to the Dutch tulip trade in the 1600 (MacKay, 1841), up to the estab-
lishment of the world’s first future exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade1, in 1848. The
foundation of the Chicago Board of Exchange2 coinciding with the publishing of the Nobel
Prize winning fundamental pricing model of Black and Scholes, and Merton in 1973, the
derivatives trade assumed its current form.
Both financial and commodity markets use derivatives as a key function for risk mit-
igation and transfer. Some commodity markets show that derivatives consist of the main
part of the trade on the total market. Even in mature markets, the transactional value on the
derivatives market is generally several times that of the spot market (Beaver, 2007). There
has been an explosive growth in the use of financial derivatives, mainly due to more volatile
markets, deregulations, and introduction of new technologies (Siems, 1997). This enor-
mous trading on derivatives markets makes it interesting to propose such market on Grid
resources.
5.1.1.2 What is Derivatives
Definition 9 A derivative is an instrument whose price depends on, or is derived from, the
price of another asset (Hull, 2005).
We use Virtual Servers, treated in section 5.2, as the underlying assets for Grid swaps.
Because of pricing issues, we let these Grid swaps serve as underlying for other derivatives
in section 5.3. While the agents use VSs for trading of computer power, that is, one party
1www.cbot.com/
2www.cboe.com/
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produce the VS and the other buys and uses it, derivatives are private contracts between
two parties, where neither has to use or produce computer power. The sum of gains and
losses on derivatives contracts must be zero; for any gain made by one party, the other party
must have suffered a loss of equal magnitude (Jorion, 2005). The party agreeing to buy the
underlying asset assumes a long position and the other takes a short position.
5.1.2 Who wants to trade risk
Participants in the derivatives market have different motivations for entering, and taking
sides, in a trade. Primary participants, the ones who trade contracts directly in the deriva-
tives market, consist of risk mitigators, speculators, and arbitrageurs. The market partici-
pants are not limited to one role, and a risk minimizer one day may become a speculator the
next. The secondary participants, consisting of clearinghouses, and market makers, ensure




Figure 5.1: The derivatives market consists of risk mitigators; both buyers and sellers of the VSs;
speculators; arbitrageurs; and secondary market participants such as market makers and clearing-
houses.
5.1.2.1 Primary Participants
Risk mitigators are parties who seek to reduce the price risk related to the trade of the VSs,
by entering into a derivatives transaction. They are, in general, organizations or individuals
who trade derivatives to establish deterministic price levels, at some future time, for the VSs
they intend to buy or sell on the CVSE. By using derivatives, they try to protect themselves
against unfavorable price changes during a certain period (Association, 2006). One example
of risk reducers in the Grid derivatives market is companies that offer computer resources to
their customers. They might buy many computer resources on the exchange, partition them
into smaller units, only to sell them to individual customers on subscription. These firms
would then be subjected to risk since they have promised their customers the servers for a
fixed sum while they themselves buy it for variable costs. As the price of the VS varies,
the companies may have incentives to reduce their price risks using Grid derivatives. The
risk minimizers are thus participants who would like to avoid price risk by fixing a certain
cap on their future asset price. In fact, each buyer and seller of computer resources on the
CVSE is a potential risk mitigator of the derivatives market.
Speculators position themselves in derivative contracts in anticipation of favorable fu-
ture market movements of the VS prices. They have an opinion about the direction of the
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underlying prices that differs from that of the majority, and are willing to take on risk for a
suitable compensation (Deng & Oren, 2006). Speculators may be traders who aim to gen-
erate profit, essentially by placing a bet on the movement of an asset. They are therefore
willing to take the other side of a trade in return for higher expected profits (Beaver, 2007).
Arbitrageurs try to profit from inconsistencies in the pricing of an asset, such as the VS.
They develop models to price various traded assets, and when they find price discrepancies,
combinations of derivatives are used to make riskless profits. Arbitrageurs contribute to
spread information in the market, thereby closing "loopholes".
5.1.2.2 Secondary Participants
Participants in a derivatives market are subject to numerous risks, such as counterparty risk,
legal risk, and administrative risks. A clearinghouse, a neutral third party, becomes the
counterpart to both the seller and the buyer in all transactions in the derivatives market and
hereby reduces these risks (Beaver, 2007). It takes on the counterparty risk and frees the
market participants from having to trust the opposite party. Beaver argues that a clearing
function most certainly increases the trading volumes of derivatives as some market partic-
ipants may be unwilling to take the above-mentioned risks.
The market makers ensure fast execution of buy and sell orders, and thereby provide
the derivatives market with liquidity (Hull, 2005). A market maker for a given contract is
someone who, when asked to do so, will quote both a bid and an ask price on the derivatives.
The bid is the price at which the market maker is prepared to buy, and the ask is the price at
which the market maker is prepared to sell. On a trader’s request, the market maker quotes
bid and offer prices without knowing whether the trader wants to buy or sell the contract,
and will give, of course, a higher ask than bid. This difference, called the bid-ask spread, is
how the market maker makes money.
5.1.3 Contract Specifications
We discuss briefly two of the important aspects to have in mind when specifying the deriva-
tives contract for a Grid market. These factors consider the trade-off between standard-
ization and customization, as well as the importance of cash settlement of the derivatives.
The reason why we do not provide clear guidelines for contract specifications is that we
believe it is important to listen to the future users of the contract in order to put up rigid
specification. We propose, where appropriate, further specifications for the derivatives.
5.1.3.1 Standardization
Standardization of contracts is important in order to maximize market liquidity, but the
contracts need to be set up in the right way so as not to lead to inflexibility that does not
satisfy any trading needs. There are several aspects that should be standardized for each
derivative, for example the contract length, size, pay-off, and so on. In order to have a
free derivatives market with the possibility to trade existing contracts, standardization of
contracts is paramount.
5.1.3.2 Cash Settlement
In the CVSE, the sellers deliver the VSs to the buyers, that is, the spot market has delivery
settlement. We can either have physical delivery or cash settlement in a derivatives market.
For financial participants, such as speculators and arbitrageurs, delivery settled contracts
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are less appealing because there is a risk of having to take or make delivery of a physical
commodity. This risk is especially pronounced if the market is illiquid and the writer is
not able to find a counterpart to annul her positions. Cash settled derivatives markets have,
therefore, a potentially higher level of liquidity than a delivery settled markets. Cash set-
tlement seems to be the most attractive solution for Grid derivatives based on the physical
asset. We now introduce a standardized, cash settled derivative, the Grid swaps, which is
the only Grid derivative based solely on the spot market.
5.2 Grid Swaps
The swap is the first of the derivatives contract we will look at. In addition to be a good
risk management tool in itself, we intend the swap to be the underlying asset for other
Grid derivatives. First, we will discuss what a swap contract really is and what its purpose
is. Afterwards, we discuss how to price the swap contracts and we find a mathematical
expression for this price process.
5.2.1 What is a Swap Contract?
The asset in the Grid market is Virtual Servers, a non-storable consumption commodity.
Agents use swaps in order to have a planning horizon and thereby reduce risk coupled to
movements in the VS prices. A swap is an agreement to exchange cash flows in the future
according to a prearranged formula (Hull, 2005).
Definition 10 A Grid swap is a derivatives contract that specifies the obligation of one
agent to exchange a fixed price with the Virtual Server price process provided by opposite
party over a specified period in the future.
The future aspect of the swap is in contrast to the spot agreement, which allows for buying
or selling an asset for a period starting immediately. The exchange of cash flow happens
over the delivery period, beginning at the future point Tb and ends at Te. The party buying
the VSs at a fixed price enters a long position, while the seller takes a short position. We let





S¯Te−Tb for short, be the average VS price during the delivery period forward priced to time
Te. Figure 5.2 illustrates one VS price process with the fixed sum Fτ and the variable cash
flow S¯Te−Tb .
The contract value of the long position at this time is:





And the short position






where r is the constant continuous risk-free interest rate. If the two swaps, long and short,
have the same contract specifications and were entered into at the same time τ , then the
pay-offs to the different parties are exactly opposite, see figure 5.3.
5.2.1.1 Risk Management Abilities
Both sellers and buyers of the swap can use the contract to increase the predictability for
the future. Someone, who needs the underlying Virtual Server, may buy a swap contract at










Figure 5.2: A price process of a Virtual Server showing the delivery period [Tb, Te] and the profit
or loss when the fixed amount Fτ is exchanged for the variable amount S¯Te−Tb . In this example, the







Figure 5.3: The payoff of the long and short positions in a Grid swap. When entered into at the
same time, the pay-offs are exactly opposite.
time τ . The buyer has to pay the fixed price, Fτ , for the use of each hour during the delivery
period of the swap, [Tb − Te]. As mentioned, the swap should have cash settlement, that
is, no Virtual Server changes hands due to the contract. The user could then buy computer
power during the period, as he planned to do, and have the floating price remunerated by
the seller.
Example 1 A company goes, because of budgetary conditions, long 10, 000 swap contracts
with delivery over a period of 7 days, or 168 hours, in three months. Today’s swap price is
100 Norwegian cents per hour. The company buys the right to have the fixed flows from the
CVSE over delivery for a total of NOK 1.7 million (10, 000 swaps · 168h · 100cents/h).
At time Te, the S¯Te−Tb turns out to be 90 cents, and the opponent(s) pay(s) NOK 1.5
million to cover the company’s outlays during the delivery. Even though the contracts
turned out to lose money, NOK 84k when ignoring interests, they did exactly what they
were supposed to: manage risk by creating deterministic prices for the Virtual Servers.
The seller of the swap, let us say a computer farm, may have a similar motivation for want-
ing a predictable future. By taking a short position in the swap, the center receives the
deterministic amount Fτ per delivery hour at time τ instead of the floating VS price. It
could sell the VSs on the CVSE during the delivery period, receiving floating revenue, and
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then exchange it with the fixed amount. The computer farm would then create predictable
incomes for a future period.
5.2.1.2 Fixed Price Evaluation
The question is how to determine a fair value on Fτ , when standing at time τ . At this time,
the participants should agree upon the price that the buyers of the Grid swap are willing
to pay, and the price the sellers are willing to accept for the future stochastic process St
so that the expected value of the swap, at the time of the contract writing, is zero. If the
prices St had been deterministic, we would not have any problems finding the Fτ . The
price would simply have been the present value of the cash flow over the delivery period.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to know the future values of the St. The normal approach of
arbitrage pricing of derivatives is not applicable either.
Definition 11 An arbitrage is a trading strategy that takes advantage of two or more assets
being mispriced relatively to each other (Hull, 2005).
That the arbitrage pricing, meaning the swap price, should be equal to today’s spot price
adjusted for some interest rate requires the possibility of cash-and-carry. This requirement
terms that it should be possible to buy the underlying asset, hold it for a period and then sell
it again in the market. If the cash-and-carry argument holds, possible arbitrages between
the swap and the underlying would be exploited as soon as they appear, and the spot and
derivatives contract should be correlated.
The Virtual Servers in the Continuous VS Exchange are, however, non-storable, and
cannot be bought and held. Without this relationship, the spot price, St, only reflects the
current state of demand and supply, and is independent of the Grid swap price process Ft
(Skantze & Ilic, 2000). This result makes the arbitrage-pricing framework, termed the First
Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, unusable for finding a fair value.
As we are not able to price the Grid swap from the spot price using the no-arbitrage
framework, how do we price these swaps and how do we proceed to find the swap price
process? Inspired by the deregulated electricity market and other non-storable commodities
with similar properties, we choose to let the market set the Grid swap prices by an auction.
Then, the swap prices reflect the expected future value of the VSs.
5.2.2 Price Determination and Information
Before we look at the determination of the swap prices, let us introduce the notion of a
filtered probability space, in order to model the derivatives market fully. The filtered prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P,F), consists of the sample space, the minimal σ-algebra containing
the open set on the sample space, the probability measure and the filtration of the σ-algebra.
The sample space, Ω, is the set of all possible outcomes and one such set is an event and P
is the probability measure of such event. The filtration F is generated by Ft. The interpre-
tation of Ft might be the market information of all events happened up to time t (Embrecht,
2003).
5.2.2.1 Price Determination by Auction
We choose to model the Grid swap price Ft using an auction similar to the one in the CVSE.
The goal of this double-sided auction is firstly to determine the fair price Ft of the swap at
each point in time t.
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Let the auction open with a discrete allocation of the swaps, say three month before
the beginning of the delivery period. That is, the auction is open for a longer period, say a
couple of hours, before the initial contract amount and price, F0, are fixed. Afterwards, the
auction could be a continuous exchange, as described in section 4.4.2.1. The market, with
supply and demand of swaps, should set all the prices Ft according to its aggregated belief






E is the expected value given the filtration Ft.
At the entry time, say τ , the expected value is equal Fτ and the value of the swap con-
tract is zero. If the expectations about the spot prices over the delivery period are true, the
Fτ will be exactly offset by the average spot price. As time goes by, new information enters
which may increase or decrease the expectations of future spot prices. This expectation
affects the prices of the newly signed contracts. In this way, the information at each point
in time, t, gives the prices of the swaps, Ft. Equivalently, the prices reflect the information
available at that time.
Example 2 This next example features a computer center that likes to have a planning
horizon of several months. They participate in the auction and get the knockdown on
selling 10, 000 Grid swaps, each on one VS during a seven-day delivery period in three
months time. The current price of the swap, say F0 = 100 Norwegian cents, reflects
the market’s expectation that the average future spot prices amount to 100 cents an hour,
over the delivery period. The value of the contract is hence nil. The next day, informa-
tion about several new computer Grid farms opening in two months enters the market.
Even though this news does not affect the spot market, because of the non-storability con-
dition, the swap prices decrease as it is expected that these farms will push the prices
down for the delivery period. Let us assume that the prices went down to 90 Norwegian
cents. If the computer center would get rid of their contracts, all they have to do is go
long 10, 000 contracts in order to neutralize the short position and realize the net loss of
NOK 167k (( 90− 100)cents/h · 168h · 10, 000 contracts).
We were, perhaps, a bit hasty when we established equation (5.4) and said that the prices
reflect the information available. This equation is in fact due to the Rational Expectation and
Efficient Market Hypotheses. In addition, these hypotheses help us on the way of forming
a mathematical expression of the price process of the swap, which is helpful when we build
other derivatives on the swaps.
5.2.2.2 Rational Expectancy and Efficient Market Hypotheses
Muth (1961) introduces the Rational Expectancy Hypothesis (REH), explaining how the
agents anticipate future prices, to reach a systematic theory of fluctuations in an econ-
omy. He predicts that a market does not waste information and assumes that actors will
in fact consider all available information, Ft, while forming the expectations about future
VS prices. Even though the expectations may not turn out correct, they will not divert sys-
tematically from the expected values. This deviation thus represents an unsystematic error
of information ignorance and mistakes.
Nobel Prize laureate Lucas and Prescott (1971) develops the theory of Muth, and de-
termines the competitive equilibrium by assuming that the actual and the anticipated prices
have the same probability distribution, meaning that the price expectations are rational. In
order to have fairness, the swaps should be priced according to the expectation of the St
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during the delivery period. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is a dynamic exten-
sion of the REH in the sense that it explains how the equilibrium results are maintained
with changing information. "The Efficient Market Hypothesis is in essence an extension
of the zero profit competitive equilibrium condition from the certainty world of classical
price theory to the dynamic behavior of prices in speculative markets under conditions of
uncertainty." (Jensen, 1978).
According to Friedman and Rust (1993) and Tan (2007), the continuous double auction
model converges to the competitive equilibrium, resulting in highly efficient allocations. In
the competitive equilibrium, the balance between offer and demand results in the market
price of the swap. The auction forms the swap price based on all available information and
expectations pertaining to what could possibly influence the spot price, already reflecting
daily load curves, seasonality, etc.
The EMH assumes that the conditions of the market equilibrium can be stated in terms
of expected returns, and that equilibrium returns are formed on the basis of, and fully re-
flects, the information set Ft. This implies that trading systems based on information in
Ft cannot have expected profits or returns in excess of the equilibrium expected profits or
returns. This is the basis of the "fair game" efficient market models (Fama, 1970).
A market is efficient with respect to the information set Ft if it is impossible to make
economic profit by trading on the basis of the information set Ft (Jensen, 1978). The basic
idea is that competition drives all the information into the price quickly, or as Samuelson
(1965a) says: "If one could be sure that a price will rise, it would have already risen." This
property is formalized as absence of arbitrage.
5.2.2.3 Absence of Arbitrage
An arbitrage is defined in definition 11, and is a trading strategy that allows an investor to
make a sure profit without taking any risk.
The meaning of absence of arbitrage (AOA) is not that arbitrage does not exist, but
when the investors, or arbitrageurs, find an arbitrage possibility, it disappears almost imme-
diately. The Efficient Market Hypothesis by Fama (1965, 1970) is concerned with whether
or not prices at any point in time "fully reflect" the available information. Arrival of new
information causes imperfection in the market, but every such imperfection is immediately
arbitraged away (Mandelbrot, 1971). This happens if there is a large number of participants
who trade and provide sufficient liquidity to the market. The economy is then in an arbi-
trage equilibrium, that is, there exists no self-financing trading strategy with no investment
in t = 0 which gives, with probability 1, a value greater than zero at a future point in time,
t > 0. We say that the swap market is a market satisfying AOA and we use this property
in chapter 5.3 to price other derivatives on the swaps. First, let us describe the swap price
process.
5.2.3 The Swap Price Process
We now establish a mathematical model, describing the price process of the Grid swap, in
order to gain more insight into the swaps. A mathematical model also has a second moti-
vation, which is that we will then be able to price other derivatives on this instrument and
perform simulations of the swaps. The first step we take to reach a model is to identify that
the process follows a random walk and holds the Markov property. Second, we assume nor-
mal distributed returns and let the process follow a Brownian motion. Finally, by allowing
only positive prices, we obtain that the swap prices follow a geometric Brownian motion.
58 CHAPTER 5. DERIVATIVES MARKET
5.2.3.1 Markov Process
The random walk model makes a more detailed statement about the economic environment,
and is an extension of the "fair game" efficient markets model. The "fair game" model states
only that the conditions for market equilibrium are in terms of expected returns, but say
little of the stochastic process generating them. The theory of random walks in asset prices
involves two hypotheses: first, that successive price changes are independent and second,
that price changes conform to some probability distribution. That is, the price differences
are independent, identically distributed variables (Fama, 1965).
Both of these hypotheses are quite general and should be applicable to our market. They
imply that the series of price changes has no memory and that the past cannot be used to
predict the future in a meaningful way. This stochastic process is in fact a Markov process,
where the entire distribution of the future prices relies on the current price only. The history
of the variable, as the way in which the present has emerged from the past, are irrelevant,
and only the price is now of any interest. We assume that price process of the swaps follow
a Markov process.
Definition 12 A Markov process is a stochastic process whereby the behavior of the vari-
able over a short period of time depends solely on the value of the variable at the beginning
of the period, not on its past history (Hull, 2005).
Using the Markov process, we are able to model the dynamics of the Grid swap. During a
small subsequent time interval dt, the price of the Grid swap changes to Ft + dFt, where
dFt is a continuous infinitesimal change. We decompose this change in two parts. One is a
predictable and deterministic part which gives the average growth rate, called the drift, µdt.
The second contribution, the disturbance, σdW¯t, models the random change in the Grid
swap price. This noise is a continuous, stationary, stochastic process W¯ multiplied with an
amplifying factor, the volatility σ. From the drift and disturbance, we obtain the Stochastic
Differential Equation (SDE)
dFt = µtdt+ σtdW¯t, t ∈ [0, T ] ,with initial value
F0 = f.
(5.5)
5.2.3.2 Wiener Process and Brownian Motion
Within finance circles, discussion about what type of distribution fits the price changes has
created a huge number of articles (Fama, 1970). Observing the stock market, Bachelier
(1900) proposes a model implying normal distributed prices changes. He assumes that
price changes from transaction to transaction are independent, identically distributed ran-
dom variables with finite variances. He says that if transactions are uniformly distributed
across time, and if the number of transactions per period is very large, then the Central
Limit Theorem leads us to expect that the price changes will have a normal distribution.
Mandelbrot (1963) raises serious doubts about the use of a normal distribution. Accord-
ing to Mandelbrot, Wesley Clair Mitchell offers, as early as in 1915, empirical evidence
showing that asset returns, or price changes, do not follow a normal distribution, but rather
a leptokurtic distribution. This "fat-tailed" distribution has been repeatedly observed in fi-
nancial markets, among others by Fama (1965) and Carr, Geman, Madan, and Yor (2002),
and is, today, an accepted fact. Much work has been done to propose alternative distri-
butions, such as the stable distribution (Fama, 1965), hyperbolic distributions (Carr et al.,
2002), which are often tested on and fitted to empirical market data (Burger, Klar, Müller,
& Schindlmayr, 2004).
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The normal distribution does not give the best fit in empirical tests on market data, but
since no Grid market data yet exists to test possible distributions, we assume the applicabil-
ity of the normal distribution. Using normally distributed returns in financial markets gives
good results most of the time, except when extreme market conditions take place (Embrecht,
2003). We assume that the Grid swap prices follow a Markov process and have normally
distributed price changes, implying that the random change dW¯ in equation (5.5) becomes
a Wiener process and the SDE in (5.5) becomes a Brownian motion.
Definition 13 A standard Wiener process W¯t is a stochastic process of continuous trajec-
tory, almost surely, with
• W0 = 0
• ∀t, s ≥ 0,Wt+s −Ws is independent of the Fs and is normally distributed N (0, t)
(Lamberton & Lapeyre, 2000).
Let W¯ be a standard Wiener process, derived on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F).
Now, let F be generated by the Wiener process FW¯t . FW¯t is the increasing subset of the
σ-algebra F generated by W¯ under the physical probability measure P.
One practical problem is that prices following a Brownian motion can become negative.
We solve this issue by the example of Samuelson (1965b), formulating normally distributed
relative price changes dFF . The prices then become lognormal and the SDE in (5.5) becomes
a geometric Brownian motion3 (GBM):
dFt
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Figure 5.4: Simulation of ten different stochastic processes, with start value 100 Norwegian cents
over a period of 90 days and a volatility of 80%.
We have now found a mathematical representation of the price process of the Grid swap
Ft on the Virtual Servers, and we are able to simulate Grid swap price processes as depicted
3The geometric Brownian motion says that the distance travelled by a particle is proportional to the square
root of time (Weron, 2000).
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in figure 5.44 . These swaps are financial, storable assets, which we can use as underlying
to value derivatives within the no-arbitrage framework. The derivatives that are written on
the Grid swap are the focus of section 5.3.
5.3 Financial Instruments on Grid Swaps
We have looked at spreading the financial risk in the Grid exchange market using deriva-
tives, and we have discussed the participants willing to take the opposite sides of these
contracts. The issue of non-storability of the Grid spot contract was solved by creating a
storable asset in the form of the Grid swap. We established the price process of the Grid
swap, which enables us to construct all kinds of derivatives using the Grid swap as under-
lying, and value them. Now, we look closer at derivatives written on the Grid swap. Such a
claim will in general have the form
Xderivative = Φ(Ft), (5.7)
that is, it is defined by the pay-off function Φ on the price process of the swap Ft. In order
for the market participants to buy and sell these contracts, they must be able to price them.
In the following, we will show how to value any claim Xderivative.
5.3.1 General Pricing and Hedging of Derivatives Written on Swaps
Let us consider a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P,F) and let the filtration F be defined
by Ft = FW¯t . Our Grid market consist of n risky swaps F 1, · · · , Fn, which differs in
some way for example in the length of the delivery period or by the expiration date. The
F i-dynamics under P are given by











t , t ∈ [0, Te] ,
F i0 = f
i
(5.8)
where f i denotes the value of the swap i at time t = 0, W¯ j is a k-dimensional standard
Wiener process, and µi and σij are adopted to the filtration representing the drift and diffu-




where the rate of return rt may vary over time. While the value of the bond enjoys an
exponential growth at rate rt, the Grid swaps fluctuate randomly.
The applicability of absence of arbitrage, which we introduced through the Efficient
Market Hypothesis in section 5.2.2.2, implies that there exists one or more Equivalent Mar-
tingale Measures (EMMs), that is the set of EMM is non-empty, Q∗ 6= {∅}. Q∗ is the set
of Q,Q ∈ Q∗, Q and P are equivalent measures Q ⇔ P, i.e. P(A) = 1 ⇔ Q(A) = 1, for
every A ∈ F (Björk, 2004).








fors ≥ t. (5.10)
4We performed these simulations on a Virtual Machine, using a version of the C++ program given in Ap-
pendix D
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By applying Grisanov’s theorem we transform the process from the physical probability
measure P to a risk-adjusted measure Q. The deterministic part of the F -dynamics is trans-
formed from µt to the interest rate rt, while the diffusion term remains unchanged. The
F i-dynamics in (5.8) are thus under a EMM Q









t , t ∈ [0, Te] ,
F i0 = f
i.
(5.11)
This EMM is not necessarily unique, meaning that we are not sure to find a unique price of
the derivative. For it to be truly distinct, the Grid market needs to be complete.
5.3.1.1 Completeness
The Grid security market is complete if we are able to replicate each cash flow from the
claims at expiry, only by investing the premium of the derivative, Π, in some portfolio
consisting of swaps, bond and/or other securities. In a complete market, we are able to
hedge each claim, as well as to find a unique price for the claim.
According to Björk (2004), a market based on the described model is complete if, and
only if, the number of Wiener processes are equal to the number of risky swaps, k = n, and
if the volatility matrix σt is invertible P-a.s.5.
Harrison and Pliska (1981) provide in their theorem a proof that in a complete, arbitrage
free market, there must exist a unique martingale measure:
Theorem 1 The second fundamental theorem states that the following statements are equiv-
alent:
• The model is complete under some probability measure.
• The set of probability measures on the (Ω,F), Q∗, is a singleton, meaning the EMM
Q is unique.
The question is whether we have a complete market. In order to provide a valuation and
hedging framework, we restrict ourselves to a contingent claim on only one swap. Since we
only have one risky asset and one driving Wiener process, n = k, the market is complete.
In accordance with theorem 1, there exists a unique martingale measure Q and the claim
Xderivative has a unique valuation.
5.3.1.2 Valuation
One of the issues the seller, often called the writer, of a financial instrument faces, is the
valuation of the claim. The claim may be exercised at time T , while the price which the
buyer has to pay to the seller is set at a prior date, let us say at t = 0. The problem is then
to find a fair price Πt of the claim X at the time t, at which the agreement is made.
We value the financial instrument consistently with the underlying swaps, using mar-
tingale pricing. This means that we construct a martingale under the EMM Q by nor-
malizing the prices of the claim: Π˜ = ΠB . At T , the price and the pay-off are equal,
ΠT (T,Φ(FT )) = Φ(FT ). If the model is complete, we obtain the general valuation for-
mula (5.12):
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After selling a derivative, the problem arises to know how the seller should cover or hedge
his positions. When selling the instrument at time t, he does not know what the Grid swap
prices will resemble in the future. If the derivatives writer does not hedge his position,
taking what is known as a naked position, he will be exposed to a price risk. Hedging
consists of taking positions in the swap market, the bond and/or other financial instruments,
to lower the risk of disadvantageous swap price movements. The valuation and hedging
problems are therefore closely related. The fact that we obtained a unique expression for
the valuation, equation (5.12) of the claim, is a proof that it is possible, at least in theory, to
hedge perfectly the derivative.
Pricing of the Grid derivatives is sensible to many factors, concerning both the under-
lying swap and the pricing model itself. These sensitivities are termed the Greeks, and are
meant to help the writer handle these risks by identifying how the derivative price is affected
by changes in the underlying, interest rate, the expiration time or the variance. By con-
structing a portfolio that is insensitive to small changes in one of these factors, the portfolio
becomes neutral, corresponding to the Greek being zero (Björk, 2004). Let V denote the
value of the portfolio, the different Greeks are the partial derivatives: Delta: ∆ = ∂V/∂F ,
Gamma: Γ = ∂2V/∂F 2, Rho: ρ = ∂V/∂r, Theta: Θ = ∂V/∂t, Vega: V ega = ∂V/∂σ.
If we let h1 be the units of the risky swap and a h0 denote the position in the riskless
bonds, we may make a portfolio Vt delta neutral in the short period [t+∆t] by letting:
h1t+∆t = ∆ and




t+∆t are Ft measurable positions, held until the next hedging of the portfolio.
Such a neutrality of the portfolio last only for a short period of time, so in order to remain
hedged against unwanted changes, it is necessary to rebalance the hedge. This is called a
dynamic hedge, and is contrary to a static hedge which is set up only when the derivative is
sold, not to be adjusted at any later point in time Hull (2005).
While the delta is the change in the portfolio price relative to the swap value, gamma is
the sensitivity of value with respect to changes in delta. If the gamma is large, delta changes
rapidly, and frequent changes in the portfolio must be done to keep it delta neutral. Rho is
the portfolio sensitivity with respect to changes in the interest rate, Theta with respect to the
time, and Vega hedging protects against variable volatility of the swap.
Another type of hedging strategy is using other derivatives as hedging instruments. By
buying a derivative with similar properties to the one sold, the different sensitivity risks are
effectively mitigated. Static hedges are often hedges with the use of other derivatives.
We are now able to value and hedge different types of derivatives on Grid swaps. We
give a throughout example of how to price and hedge one type of financial instrument,
options on swaps.
5.3.2 Options on Swaps
An option on a swap is a financial instrument giving one party, the holder, the right to buy
or sell the underlying swap, at a future time, at an agreed price, the strike K. Call options
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gives the right to buy the underlying, while a put option gives the right to sell the swap. An
option will only be exercised if it generates profit. An option is said to be in-the-money if
exercising the option would give a positive pay-off. If the pay-off is zero, than the option is
out-of-the-money.
The only downside the holder has is the price he paid for the option. At contracting, the
writer receives the option price or a premium,Π, as payment for the opportunities the holder
gets. The writer, however, has limited benefit, only the premium, and a possibly unbound
downside.
Depending on whether or not the option can be exercised during a period or at a specific
point in time, the options are classified as American and European, respectively. The last
date at which the option can be exercised is termed maturity, T . We provide a full example
of pricing and hedging with European type option on swap, the European swaption.
5.3.2.1 Valuation of the European Swaption
Options on swaps are called swaptions. A European swaption call7 has for the holder the
pay-off,
X callswaption = Φ(FT ) = max [0, FT −K] . (5.14)
The put has the same pay-off except the K, and the FT has switched place. The writer has














Figure 5.5: Pay-off diagram for the short and long call, and short and long put.
The pricing formula for an hour-priced European swaption is found by evaluating the
risk neutral expectation, equation (5.12) inserted equation (5.14). We perform this calcula-
tion in appendix A and present the resulting formulas here. The European call swaption is
priced by:
Πt = ct(Ft, T ) = Ft N (d1)−Ke−r(T−t)N (d2) , (5.15)
and the put swaption:
Πt = pt(Ft, T ) = Ke−r(T−t)N (−d2)− Ft N (−d1) . (5.16)
These formulas give the price per hour, meaning that we need to multiply by the number of
hours in the delivery period [Tb, Te] to obtain the true price per contract. T is the maturity
date of the option, Ft is the price of a swap at time t, while K is the agreed upon strike. r
7A call swaption is also known as a payer swaption, while a put option on a swap is a receiver swaption
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is the constant interest rate for the whole period and at the beginning of the delivery period.
d1 and d2 is:
d1(Ft,K, T ) =
ln(FtK ) + (r +
σ2
2 ) (T − t)
σ
√
(T − t) ,




where N ( · ) is the cumulative normal function. We now perform a calculation of an exam-
ple to show how these formulas work.
Example 3 A computer center would like to have a planning horizon of three months. They
anticipate a decrease in the Virtual Server price, but would also like to benefit if the prices
would rise substantially. Let us say that it is normal in the derivatives market that the option
expires one month before the underlying swap contract, so the swaption has an expiration
date in two months, T = 60. The company would then buy, let us say, 10, 000 European
put swaptions with strike 95 Norwegian cents, K = 95, and with a delivery period of one
week, Tb = 90 and Te = 97. Suppose that these three-month-Grid-swaps are traded at 100
Norwegian cents/hour, Fτ = 100, and that they have a constant volatility 80 %, σ = 0.8.
The continuous risk free rate of the bond is constant at five percent p.a., r = 0.05. We find
the price of one such European put using the pricing formula (5.16):
p = (9, 83 cents/h · 168 hours) = NOK 16.51,
and the total price the computer center pays for all 10, 000 contracts is: NOK165, 000.
Two months later, it turns out that the prices really have declined substantially and the
swaps are now trading at F60 = 90. The computer center exercises the option and is able to
sell the underlying swap contracts forK = 95 instead of 90. By paying the initial premium,
the company has been able to postpone the risk management decision of selling the swaps.
Had the swap prices moved in the other direction, say F60 = 110, the company would have
done better by not exercising the option and selling swaps at the market price.
5.3.2.2 Hedging of the European Swaption
The writers of European swaptions will often try to hedge their sale of the options. Although
they are attracted by the premium, they have a risk of severe losses, even unbound in the
case of European call, if the price movements are, in their point of view, adverse. In a delta
hedge, small movements in the swaption price, due to movements in the underlying, are
exactly offset by the delta position in the swap itself. For the portfolio to be delta neutral,
we use the formula we derive in the appendix A. For a call swaption, the delta formula is:
∆call = N (d1) , (5.18)
and for a put swaption:
∆put = N (−d2) . (5.19)
We provide formulas for the other Greeks in Appendix A.
Example 4 The writer of the European put swaption, used in example 3, wishes to hedge
her short position. She would like to set up an initial delta hedge, in order to make the
portfolio relatively insensitive to small changes in the swap prices. The writer manages
to do this by going short ∆ = 0.365 swaps per option sold, in total, 3, 648 swaps. The
money from both selling the swaption and the swaps are invested in the bond. Let us say
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that during a very short time, the swap price has declined to 98 Norwegian cents. The
price of the option has now risen to 17.77 NOK (Π(Ft = 98,K = 90) · 168 h), which is
the amount the writer would have had to pay to the holder if the option would have been
exercised, yielding a net loss of (16.51−17.77) cents/h · 10, 000 = NOK−12, 600. The
short swap position has a net gain NOK 12, 260 (2 cents · 168 h · 3, 648 swaps) because
the writer has to pay less to repay the swaps borrowed in the market; in addition, she has
some (insignificant) interest income on the bonds position. In total, she encounters a loss
on about NOK 340 instead of a loss on NOK 12, 600 (!) if un-hedged.
In order to maintain delta neutrality over a longer period, the swap position must be
changed. Since the delta is a derivative of the option price to the underlying, the neutrality
only lasts for small changes in the swap price, depicted in figure 5.6. For larger price move-
ments, the delta position would not neutralize the movements in the option price. Hence,
for larger movements in the price, the delta needs to be recalculated and the portfolio rebal-
anced. The answer to how many rebalances are necessary to keep a delta neutral portfolio
in a frictionless market is: the more, the merrier. In a real situation, the hedging is done
under the real probability measure P, as the hedging take place with real price processes.
We perform the hedging as a simulation and hedge under the probability measure Q, but
the result is equivalent. By simulating many different swap price processes, we are able
to analyze how well different delta strategies affect the success of the hedge. The main
factors of such simulations are the variance of the end value of all the simulations and the
maximum loss encountered in the worst possible simulation. These will show how well the
process is controlled, as well as the worst-case scenario. Other factors, which also might be
considered, are the mean profit of all the simulations as well as the maximum payoff of the







Figure 5.6: Relation between swap price and option price at time τ > T . For the put option, an
increase in the swap price would result in a smaller pay-off. The∆ is therefore negative.
We use a computer Grid to run the simulations. The example serves to illustrate two
points: that we are able to perform calculations on the Grid swaptions, and that Grids can
be used for high through-put calculations. If we had run the simulations on a single server,
it would have taken approximately 40 hours wall-time, while using Grid computing with
nodes, the time wall-clock time required is approximately 1.58 hours. We do not suggest
using this much resources to calculate simple options, as we do with the European swaption,
but for valuating very complex options on swaps, even larger Grids might be required to
obtain the results fast enough. We implement the hedging strategies in the programming
8The wall clock time used by the Grid is not simply 40/31 because the nodes used are not identical and
some are slower than others. In addition, the Grid has some overhead of distributing the jobs, and in our case,
some nodes are used to other jobs as well.
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language C++ and provide the code in appendix D. We also provide, in appendix C, a
job description file along with useful commands in order to run C++ executable programs
successfully on a Grid using the gLite middleware. A computer-adapted (that is not Grid-
adapted) version of the hedging program can be found on the accompanying CD.
Example 5 Let us return to the swaption writer of example 4 with her problem of how to
hedge the 10, 000 two-month European put swaption on the three-month swap. The most im-
portant factors to notice are the variance and the maximum loss. Both these values represent
how much risk the writer takes on. Remember, she might encounter unbound loss, but only a
finite gain. We simulate 3, 000, 000 swap price processes and see what happens when we put
up different delta hedging strategies. The result is depicted in table 5.3.2.2. First, a naked
position is considered. Despite having a mean of almost zero9, the worst outcome scenario
predicts a loss of 64.2 cents/h, see table 5.1. Not to hedge the swaption would in the worst
case represent a loss of NOK1.08 million (64.2cents/h · 168h · 10, 000swaptions). The
biggest gain for the writer is the premium that we, in example 3, found to be NOK165k.
The variance also increases the writer’s risk. The variance numbers should be seen as a
dispersion of the pay-offs. A large number means that the pay-offs from the simulations will
spread, while a small number represent a relatively grouped outcome. The naked position
has a variance of 188 which represent considerable uncertainty about the outcome.
If our writer performs only one hedge, that is, when selling the swaption she immedi-
ately delta hedges and holds this position until expiration, the variance has now improved to
be 87, again see table 5.3.2.2 This variance is still too high and represents a huge risk. The
highest value that the swap reaches at the expiration of the option is 416.8 Norwegian cents
whereas the swaption had a strike price of 95 cents. This figure, however, only appears to
be good news. The maximum encountered loss is even worse than for the un-hedged posi-
tion: NOK2.37million (!) in total (141cents/h · 168h · 10, 000swaptions). In this case,
the maximum loss can be blamed on the short position in the swap, taken at the beginning.
When the swap price sharply increases, the swaption is worthless, so she does not have any
loss on it, but she has to buy back the swaps from the market to make up for the short sell.
Increasingly frequent rebalancing severely reduces the variance. We have calculated
the different factors based on rebalancing once a month, ever 10 days, every day, each 2.5
hours and so on, ending up with the extreme of rebalancing nearly every 1.4 minutes. In
the latter case, the variance is reduced drastically to 0.02 and the maximum loss is only
NOK 11k. Figure 5.7 illustrates the reduction in the output spread when the number of
hedges increases, while table 5.3.2.2 gives an overview of the mean, variance, maximum
loss and maximum gain in each hedging case.
When looking at the mean in the table, we see that it is close to zero, but still negative for
all cases. In an ideal case, it should be identical zero, c.f. the original replication argument
of Black and Scholes. In Monte Carlo simulations, the simulated price is seldom exactly
the same as the theoretical price. We suspect the difference to be a result of the number of
calculations, the built-in random generator, and the approximate programming of the price
process. In fact, when we run 10E9 simulation with no hedging, the mean is reduced to
8.0E−4, hence the simulations give a good estimate of the option price.
In reality, the problem with such frequent rebalancing of the portfolio is its cost. In the
Grid market, as in any other market, it is impossible to buy and sell options to the same price.
There are, of course, parties that facilitate the trading and would like to be compensated for
the job they do, for example the clearinghouse and the market makers. This compensation
9























Figure 5.7: The figure at the top shows how the variance goes down with increasing number of
hedges. Here, the longest hedging period is one month, while the shortest is one day. At the bottom
figure, we have gradually increased the number of hedges. Note the difference in axis from the top
figure. The pay-off span is much narrower, and the frequency is 10 times higher. Daily hedging is
included also in the bottom figure as a reference. We see here a similar result, with relatively high
variance for the more seldom hedges to a narrow peak for hedging seven times a minute. For this
extreme hedging, the mode over the defined pay-off intervals has a frequency of almost 900,000.
results in incurred transaction costs for the trades concluded in the swap market, making
it more difficult to perform continuous delta hedging. In such an environment, the writer
would prefer not to set specific times to perform the hedging, but she would rather focus on
the movement in the swap prices. If the prices are quite stable during a period, she sees no
need to rebalance the portfolio.
We have now given arguments in support of the development of a derivatives market on
Grid resources, and shown that it is indeed technically possible to construct such market.
The question must now be addressed, is, once put into effect, would the market be able to
last?
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Number of hedges Mean Variance Maximum Loss Maximum Gain
Naked position −4.95E−2 1.88E2 −6.42E1 9.83E0
Immediate hedging −7.85E−2 8.70E1 −1.41E2 1.19E1
Each month −7.81E−2 4.70E1 −9.62E1 12.1E1
Each 10th day −8.23E−2 1.71E1 −4.21E1 11.9E1
Every day −8.07E−2 1.89E0 −1.24E1 7.72E0
Each 2.5 hours −8.08E−2 2.08E−1 −3.57E0 3.16E0
Each half hour −8.06E−2 3.24E−2 −1.43E0 1.23E0
Every 1.4 minutes −8.07E−2 1.56E−2 −6.38E−1 5.53E−1
Table 5.1: Depiction of how the mean, variance, maximum loss and maximum gain are changed
with different hedging strategies. Generally, an increasing number of hedges reduces the variance
and makes the final pay-off more sure. In addition, the risk of large losses is also reduced, so is the
maximum profit. The mean is almost unaffected by the hedging frequency.
5.4 Success Factors for a Derivatives Market on Grid Resources
Far from all proposed derivatives contracts become commercially successful. According to
Vassdal (1995), only 30 percent of all futures contracts thrive. 70 percent of the initiated
futures contracts are completely withdrawn from trading, or are traded in low volumes. In
order for a derivatives market to exist, Cuny (1993) emphasizes that it must attract agents
who want to use financial instruments for risk management purposes. Even though the Grid
resource buyers normally take opposite position of the Grid resource sellers, the swap mar-
ket needs more liquidity in order to be successful, enter the speculators. They are motivated
by the possibility of profiting on the present risks. A successful derivatives market provides
the risk mitigators with both a high-quality risk management instrument and a liquid market
where these instruments can be traded at low cost (Cuny, 1993).
A market’s successfulness depends on several factors in the underlying market, the con-
tract specification, the properties, and the external factors of the market. These factors are
derived from common factors for successfulness of futures markets, and we see that the
Grid derivatives market do indeed fulfill many of these requirements. The presences of
these elements do not guarantee success, but the absence of them will certainly reduce its
probability.
5.4.1 Underlying Market Factors
In order to ensure greater probability of success with a derivatives market, the underlying
market should contain homogeneous, standardized and expensive products. In order for the
derivatives market to be viable, the underlying market should have a degree of uncertainty
and volatility that is difficult to control with existing financial risk management solutions.
5.4.1.1 Uncertainty and Volatility in the Underlying Market
If the prices were stable, no one would ever have to face risk, since all price movements
would be deterministic. A volatile and uncertain market would attract both risk managers
and speculators. Price uncertainty could be leveled out by the use of derivatives and people
with different beliefs about future prices would find this market an attractive place in which
to speculate (Carlton, 1984). The Continuous Virtual Server Exchange, CVSE, probably
contains both uncertainty and variability. This is due to the non-storability property of the
resources, as well as the trading mechanism being a continuous double-sided auction.
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5.4.1.2 Expensive Products
There would not be much of a risk if the price movements only insignificantly affected the
agents. In order to have a viable derivatives market, the participants must be significantly
affected by adverse price movements. Even though one Virtual Server by itself probably is
not very expensive, the buyers would likely wish to require many of these. In addition, the
delivery happens over a period, making the total risk of price movements quite severe.
5.4.1.3 Homogeneous Resources and Standardization
A derivatives market has a larger chance of viability if the products are homogeneous. If
differences exist, these can be identified based on physical and not personal judgment (Vass-
dal, 1995). This requirement is fully satisfied for the Virtual Servers. VSs are standardized
homogeneous resources based on some common requirements.
5.4.1.4 Not Possible to Reduce Risk with Other Existing Financial Instruments
The relation of underlying with existing contracts also affects the viability of a new deriva-
tives contract. New contracts that allow risk management of previously unmanaged risks
have a greater chance of being popular (Rausser & Bryant, 2004). If a trading place for
computer resources is established, there are no other market segments where trade of simi-
lar goods is conducted. One could imagine buying or selling futures on stocks in the com-
puter centers, perhaps combined with electricity, to provide some risk management, but
this seems rather farfetched. We find that there does not exist any other way of financially
reducing the risk of future price movements other than creating the Grid swap market.
5.4.1.5 Large Potential Number of Interested Participants and Industrial Structure
A large underlying market is important so that no one has the possibility to manipulate the
underlying prices (Vassdal, 1995). It would be interesting for a speculator with a huge short
position in derivatives, when these are in-the-money, to manipulate the swap prices to make
the derivatives out-of-the money. If such manipulation should take place, this would result
in severe loss of confidence in the derivatives market. With a large number of participants
in the underlying market, each agent is too small to effectively affect the prices. Carlton
(1984) argues that more firms are involved in buying or producing a good, the bigger the
number of potential actors on the derivatives market, and hence greater chance for it to
develop. It is difficult to say anything about the market size for Grid computing, as the
market does not yet exist. Still, as there are no particular barriers to enter such a computing
trading place, e.g. the cost of sending information is decreasing; computing exists in every
company, department and home, the likelihood for a Grid spot market is high.
5.4.2 Design of the Derivatives Contract
While the ability of the underlying to create a foundation for a derivatives market is mostly
exogenously given, or the result of the specifications in the spot market, the design of the
derivatives contracts will directly affect the viability of the contract in a financial instrument
market. There are plenty of examples of failures due to poor design of the contract. Rausser
and Bryant (2004) finds that proposals emanating from the academy seem to fail more often
than proposals from practitioners. We are therefore very prudent and desist from placing too
many rigorous constraints. We will discuss, however, two important factors when designing
derivatives contracts: the product specifications and the prevention of manipulation.
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5.4.2.1 Identical Products
One of the success factors of contract specification is that the contract should be as identical
as possible to what the risk mitigator would like to secure (Vassdal, 1995). For a stan-
dardized market, this is difficult, as it uses the resources differently, and so probably also
has different risk management needs. For the Grid market, we propose trading the same
resources, Virtual Servers, in both the spot and derivatives market, but with unequal usage
periods. For the spot market, short time periods are suitable as these provide greater flex-
ibility. While in the derivatives market, we need longer time periods because this reduces
the number of contracts and hereby increases the liquidity.
5.4.2.2 Prevention of Manipulation
Another factor related to contract design is prevention of manipulation. In addition to having
a large underlying market, the contract specification must also be set up so that no single
party or group can control the delivered good. A common strategy for preventing corners
and squeezes is to allow delivery of nonstandard grades of an underlying asset at a premium,
or at discounted future prices (Rausser & Bryant, 2004). For the Grid market, we have
suggested a multi grade resource. It might be interesting to build swap prices on only normal
graded Virtual Servers, while the other grades are traded with a premium or discount, and
hence reduce the chance of manipulations.
5.4.3 Market Factors
We present some market factors that increase the success rate. These are the absence of
governmental rules and regulations, and a proper design of the market surroundings that
ensures that the agents hold their commitments.
5.4.3.1 Government
There are many examples of governmental regulations that have destroyed existing futures
markets. For instance, some coffee, cotton, butter, rice, tobacco and peanut futures were
subject to such regulations (Vassdal, 1995). Carlton (1984) also empirically finds that suc-
cessful contracts are based on non-subsidized commodities. It is not given how governments
would react to an international trade of computer resource, but some degree of protection-
ism, taxation, information control, or other barriers are likely to appear.
5.4.3.2 The Commitments are Met
In order for an agent to voluntarily enter a contract agreement; he must be positive that
the counterpart will keep her promises, explicitly stated in the contract (Rausser & Bryant,
2004). If the agents cannot be certain of this, derivatives trading will be very difficult. In a
Grid setting, we recommend the use of a clearinghouse in order to separate the writer from
the holder, and to eliminate the risk of default.
Chapter Summary:
This chapter started with the assumption of the existence of a functioning trading market for
Grid resources. We argued that a derivatives market would attract participants with different
motives. We introduced the notion of swap contracts and claimed that this would create a
stable future for the risk mitigators. The pricing of these swap contracts was suggested
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to be done by way of auctions, and we argued that the swap price process would follow
a geometric Brownian motion. We showed that it is possible to price and hedge other
derivatives on these swaps and gave a complete example one such derivative, the European
swaption. Finally, we presented different factors increasing the probability of a successful
derivatives market, to conclude that a derivatives market on Grid resources should satisfy
most of these factors.
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Summary of Part II
While chapter 2 dealt with the immense computing need CERN faces and treated the solu-
tion to this problem, chapter 3 argued that the scarcity of computer resources is, and will
continue to advocate a commercial trade of these resources through Grids. In chapter 4
"Exchange Market", we outlined an exchange for Grid resources on which we built the
derivatives market in chapter 5 "Derivatives Market". For quick reference, we have illus-






Figure 5.8: The complete Grid economy
discussed the agents that might be interested in a Grid resource trading market. We found
that the potential buyers in the market were providers of Hardware-as-a-Service (HaaS) ,
either selling to external organizations, or providing the service internally, as the User In-
tegrators and the Software Integrators do. We state that the sellers of Virtual Servers are
professional resource vendors, such as huge computer centers. These agents are depicted in
figure 5.8.
We found that the best way in which buyers and sellers could meet to trade Grid re-
sources would be through a double-sided auction. We developed two different, but re-
lated, markets: the Continuous Virtual Server Exchange (CVSE) and the Over-The-Counter
(OTC) market. In the OTC market, resources with a special feature, be it high performance
CPUs or a particular storage capacity is offered. We proposed that these special resources
should be traded by periodic auctions, where the buyers specify minimum resource crite-
ria and the sellers state the maximum. The auctioneer then proceeds to solve this resource
allocation optimization problem.
For the CVME, the market mechanism is a bit different. First of all, it operates with
continuous allocation in order to fully satisfy the requirement of scheduling efficiency. The
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bidders and sellers are able to obtain or sell resources immediately by posing a buy- or
sell order, respectively. Second, only homogeneous, non-storable, single-attributed bundles
of computer resources, called Virtual Servers (VS), are traded, making the auctioneer’s
allocation and pricing problem easy to solve. We found the allocation problem complexity
of CVSE to be only O (n lg(n)).
The CVSE satisfies most of the requirements from the agents, resources and other fac-
tors. The biggest problem was that the market is not guaranteed to be economically efficient,
and that it might provoke erratic, not-foreseen price changes. These price oscillations are
due both the construction of the mechanism as continuous, market specific factors and ex-
ternal factors, and create difficulties for the agents who rely on stable environments. We
therefore suggested the construction of a financial derivatives market on Grid computing.
The problem of creating a derivatives market is that the VSs are non-storable. It is,
thus, impossible to exploit normal arbitrage theory. To cope with this issue, we constructed
swap contracts as the link between the CVSE market and the derivatives market, depicted in
figure 5.8. A swap contract is an agreement to exchange a future variable cash flow with a
deterministic cash flow over a period, called the delivery period. We let the possible buyers
and sellers, that is, the risk mitigators, speculators and arbitrageurs, buy and sell the swaps
in an exchange. We stated, based on the Rational Expectancy Hypothesis and the Efficient
Market Hypothesis that there was absence of arbitrage in the swap market, and that the price
process can be described as aMarkov process. We further assumed normal distributed price
changes and let the price process follow a geometric Brownian motion.
We were then able to model other derivatives on these swaps, and we posed the general
pricing and delta-hedging formulæ (5.12) and (5.13). We gave an example of a derivative
on swaps, namely the European swaption. This gives the holder the possibility, but not
the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying swap at strike K at the expiration date T . We
derived the pricing formula for the call- (5.15) and the put- (5.16) swaption. We gave a large
hedging example with the use of Monte Carlo simulation, calculated with the use of Grid
computing, and showed how delta hedging makes the variance and max loss decrease with
increased hedging frequency.
Finally we discussed common success factors for derivatives markets and saw how un-
derlying market factors, such as product specifications, uncertainty, and the possibility of
reducing risk with existing products, directly affected the applicability of derivatives. In
addition, the design of the derivatives contract and external market factors, such as govern-
mental regulations and the existence of a clearinghouse, affect the probability of success.
We stated that a Grid derivatives market does indeed fulfill several of these criteria.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter we summarize our findings, state what we believe to be our contributions to
this field, and finally propose some subjects for further research.
6.1 Conclusion and Our Contribution
We have built on the expectation that a trading market for computer resources will emerge,
but as mentioned in section 3.3 there are barriers such as licensing, standards, and culture.
However, we view this as the future based on the strong trend of delivering IT as a service.
Furthermore, a derivatives market on Grid resources seems both probable and viable. In
a spot market for computer resources with unpredictable, erratic prices, the agents will
request ways to manage their risk. We have constructed a complete, coherent Grid economy,
consisting of both a spot market and a derivatives market. Given this market combination,
the participants wishing to reduce their risks related to computer resource trade are able to
find other parties willing to take on these risks.
To link the spot and the derivatives markets, we have suggested Grid swap contracts.
Besides being a risk mitigation instrument, the swap allows for further construction of
derivatives. With the introduction of this storable asset, that is the Grid swap, we build
a theoretical framework for pricing and hedging of the derivatives contracts.
The future existence of a derivatives market depends, to a large extent, on how the
underlying market will behave. Market trends indicate that IT will be transformed from
a good into a service in a few years. We argue that a standardized bundle of computer
resources, termed a Virtual Server, can be a good candidate for the traded service unit.
However, continuous trading of homogeneous resources allows for scheduling efficiency
and market liquidity, but may result in risk erratic and unpredictable prices. The suggested
derivates market then proceeds to redirect the risk of erratic and unpredictable price pattern
that could normally result from such a market, in the directing of those willing to invest in
them.
The computer resource trading is founded on the Grid technology. We are convinced
that the Grid has bright commercial business prospects. In fact, market analysis show that
Grid computing is 2-5 years away from mainstream adoption. A number of commercial
sectors have already implemented large Grids, but inn order for the different Grids to com-
municate with each other, open standards are needed. Information Technology is a driving
economic force in society, which motivates the politicians to invest in R&D and promote
the Grid technology to commercial actors. With the growing adoption of the Grid, the IT
industry stands before an irreversible paradigm shift, which will greatly impact both the IT
market and society in general.
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We have employed our techno-economic knowledge on the Grid Computing technology
to look at it from a different perspective than the traditional Physics and Engineering focus
at CERN. For CERN, this thesis offers deeper insight into possible commercial aspects of
the technology. Companies, especially start-ups working with Grid computing related to
CERN, may take interest in this thesis as it will allow the reader to better understand the
existing market and be aware of possibilities if a trading market ever appears. Such a market
will be able to provide easy access to inexpensive computing, which is especially interesting
to entrepreneurs. The innovators should be aware of the market risks, and know how to
mitigate these. Thus, our thesis may serve as a tool for CERN to disseminate knowledge
internally as well as externally.
6.2 Further research
We believe that further studies of the Grid economy would be interesting. For instance,
performing simulations on these markets could provide important knowledge concerning
the economic efficiency of the proposed markets, both for the derivatives and the underlying
market. These data could later be compared to other mechanisms, in order to further assess
the Grid economy. Laboratory tests, where people apply different strategies and learning
abilities on the proposed markets, may also indicate how well these markets would perform
in practice.
In addition, to make this market come true, exact specifications of the Virtual Servers
are needed. It would be interesting to study which resources to include in this bundle, in
order to satisfy as many parties as possible. The same specifications study could be done
for the Grid swaps in order to find the optimal standard contract.
Finally, further studies might also be conducted into possible new derivatives contracts,
especially designed for the need of the participants. For some sectors using Grid resources,
exotic swaptions such as the American, look-back, swing or barrier swaptions, might be
suited to cover a particular Grid resource requirement. The study of different types of
derivatives contracts would provide a valuable addition to risk management or speculations
on Grid computing.
With great excitement, we look forward to the day when the access to entire world’s





Derivation of the European Swaption
Put and Call Formulas
The goal of this appendix is to derive the pricing formulas for the European swaptions
given in section 5.3.2.1 and the hedging formulas of section 5.3.2.2. First we derive the
price process of the Grid swap, then, we derive the pricing and hedging formulas.
A.1 Price process of the Grid Swaption
We assume the swap price change follow a geometric Brownian motion
dFt = Ftµdt+ FtσdW¯t, under P, (A.1)
Where µ is the real drift of the swap, σ is the constant volatility of the returns of the swap





Where r is the constant market rate of return, we obtain
dFt = rFtdt+ σFtdWt, under Q,













and by integrating and solving for FT , we have the following relation:






Ft is a exponential martingale under Q.
A.2 Pricing of the European Swaption
The stochastic claim is defined by
Xswaption = Φ(T, x), (A.3)
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where Φ is the pay-off function of the derivatives. Given absence of arbitrage in the swap






The pay-off function of the European call swaption, X callswaption, is
Φ(FT ) = [FT −K]+ , K > 0. (A.5)
The price of a European call swaption is










































We would like to get rid of the max function in equation (A.8) in order to evaluate the
integral. By noting that
[· · · ]+ =
0 if σ
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We solve the first line in (A.9) with respect to u and obtain
σ
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A.3. HEDGING OF THE EUROPEAN SWAPTION v









= Ft N (d1)−Ke−r(T−t)N (d2) .
We thus obtain the formula for the price of an European swaption call, where
d1(F,K, T ) =
ln(FtK ) + (r +
σ2
2 ) (T − t)
σ
√
(T − t) ,
d2(F, T ) = d1(F, T )− σ
√
(T − t).
The derivation for the European swaption put is similar and we only state the result:
pt(Ft, T ) = Ke−r(T−t)N (−d2)− Ft N (−d1) . (5.16)
With d1 and d2 defined in (5.17) We have now the pricing expressions given in section
5.3.2.1.
A.3 Hedging of the European swaption
The hedging formulas are easy to find. First, let us find the delta of an European call
swaption. By taking the partial derivative of equation (5.15) by with respect to Ft and
derivate by part we obtain:
∂ct(Ft, T )
∂Ft





We know that ∂N (di)∂Ft = n(di)
∂di
∂Ft
. and that n(d2) =
n(d1)Ft
Ke−r(T−t) Since d2 = d1 − σ
√
T − t,
the derivatives of d1 and d2 with respect to Ft are equal. By inserting these relations into










The formula for the delta of a swaption call is
∆call = N (d1) . (A.11)




= N (−d2) (A.12)
For the other Greeks we only provide the results (these are adapted from Haug (2005a,
2005b)):
















= −(T − t)Ke−r(T−t)N (−d2)























T − t+ rKe−r(T−t)N (−d2)
Appendix B
Complexity for the CVSE Allocation
Problem
We here show that the allocation algorithm of the auctioneer in the case of CVSE has a
complexity of O(n log n). Let him possess two sorted arrays, one with asks in queue, and
one with bids. The bids and asks comes in with irregular frequency, but never more than
one at the same time. The pseudo code for the allocation problem would be:
1 . f o r a l l b i d s and a sk s do / / We on l y l ook a t incoming b ids , bu t s i m i l a i r f o r a s k s
2 . i f b id > sm a l l e s t a sk i n ask queue
3 . a l l o c a t e t h e r e s o u r c e s and upda t e t h e ask−l i s t
4 . e l s e :
5 . i n s e r t b i d i n s o r t e d bid−l i s t
Let n be the number of bids and ask. We use asymptotic notation, where O is the up-
per bound complexity when the problem size increases to infinite. For the grid allocation
problem, this would be if the number of bidders and sellers become infinite. Let us call
the number of buyers and sellers n. We now take a look at the pseudo code to find the
complexity of the allocation problem of CVSE.
First, let us look at line 2 to 5. Line 3 is effectuated only if the incoming bid is bigger
than the smallest ask in the ask queue, as stated by line 2. The comparison and the even-
tual update in the queue is done in constant time, (O(1)), as these operations are standard
constant time operations.
If the "if" in line 2 is not fulfilled, the program skips line 3 and moves on to line 4. It
will effectuate line 5. How long time search and insert in a bid/ask-list takes depends on
the size of the array. If there are few bidders in the queue, as it would be at the beginning
of allocation, the time taken would be short. As the time passes, the number of bidders
and sellers, and hence the size of the arrays, become large. In the worst case, that is if
no allocation has ever been effectuated, the basic operations of search and insert of an
unmatched bid would takeO(log n1).n1 represent the number of elements in the bid queue.
In fact, the complexity of this line, taking both buyers and sellers into account is, in the
worst case, O(log n).
The for-loop in line 1 would increase the complexity with a factor n because this "for"
is effectuated n times. In fact The whole allocation problem of CVSE would have a worst
case complexity of O(n log n), as stated in section 4.4.3.
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Appendix C
Running Jobs on the Grid with gLite
Middleware
We present here more information about the steps resulting in running jobs on the Grid. The
Virtual Organization (VO) blaubert was created on our demand especially for the study of
hedging of the European swaption on Grid resources. Then, this VO was added to a VOMS
server (a Virtual Organization Membership Service server containing the credentials and
the rights of the different VOs) and the different computer centers were encourage to allow
the blaubert to use their computer resources.
We used gLite as middleware to submit our jobs to the Grid. gLite is a middleware
developed by the international collaboration: Enabling Grids for E-sciencE (EGEE). A
middleware is a necessary tool to build a grid and submitting jobs to the grid requires a
special file containing job specifications. We give an example of a job description file used
to submit several jobs to the grid, called job.jdl
/ / Job D e s c r i p t i o n Language
[
Type = " C o l l e c t i o n " ; / / m u l t i p l e j o b s a t t h e same t ime
V i r t u a l O r g a n i s a t i o n = " b l a u b e r t " ; / / Our VO
Inpu tSandbox = { " s c r i p t " , " F i n a n c i a l _De r i v a t i v e s _Ma r k e t _ f o r _G r i d _Compu t i n g . cpp " , " EuropeanSwapt ion . cpp " , "
EuropeanSwapt ion . h " , " normal . cpp " , " normal . h " ) ; / / I n p u t a c omp i l a t i o n s c r i p t and a l l t h e n e c e s s a r y
f i l e s t o comp i l e
S tdOu tpu t = " S td . ou t " ;
S t dE r r o r = " S td . e r r "
De fau l tNodeSha l l owRe t ryCoun t = 5 ; / / Try max 5 t im e s
Nodes = [ / / two nodes
[
Ex e cu t a b l e = " s c i r p t " ;
OutputSandbox = { " i n f o rma t i o n 1 . x l s " } ; / / o u t p u t r e s u l t s t o i n f o rma t i o n 1 . x l s
] ,
[
Ex e cu t a b l e = " s c r i p t " ;




The script file has the command lines:
/ / t h e s c r i p t f i l e
/ / Compile , s e t r i g h t s , run program
# ! / b i n / bash
g++ F i n a n c i a l _De r i v a t i v e s _Ma r k e t _ f o r _G r i d _Compu t i n g . cpp EuropeanSwapt ion . cpp normal . cpp −o mas t e r . exe
/ b i n / chmod 777 . / ma s t e r . exe
. / ma s t e r . exe
Several commands are used to communicate with the grid, where the most important are:
Submit a job: glite-wms-job-submit -output identifier.id -collection job.jdl, where it says to
do send the job collection.jdl to the grid and receive some job-tracking files in identifier.id
Check job-status: glite-wms-job-status -input identifier.id
Get job-output, in our case, the information.xls files: glite-job-get-job-output -input
identifier.id
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Appendix D
Implementation of Pricing and
Hedging of European Swaptions in
C++
We provide our implementation of the pricing and hedging of a European Swaption. We
write the simulation code in C++, and for simplicity, we only show the cpp files and not the
header files. We performed our calculations using a Grid, described in appendix C.
/ / ******************************************************************\ \
/ / \ \
/ / F i n a n c i a l D e r i v a t i e s Market f o r Grid Computing \ \
/ / \ \
/ / Purpose : \ \
/ / C a l c u l a t e p r i c i n g and hedg ing o f European swap t i on \ \
/ / t o show how d i f f e r e n t hedg ing s t r a t e g i e s a f f e c t t h e \ \
/ / v a r i ance , maximum lo s s , maximum ga in and t h e mean \ \
/ / \ \
/ / \ \
/ / Programmed by : David Auber t and \ \
/ / A r n s t e i n S e l j e f l o t S o l l i \ \
/ / (C) 2007 \ \
/ / \ \
/ / \ \
/ / \ \
/ / v e r s i o n : 1 . 0 \ \
/ / Programmed f o r i n d i v i d u a l t o s im u l a t e a Grid approach \ \
/ / \ \
/ / \ \
/ / ******************************************************************\ \
/ / F i n a n c i a l D e r i v a t i v e s Market f o r Grid Computing . cpp : De f i n e s t h e e n t r y p o i n t f o r t h e c on s o l e a p p l i c a t i o n .
/ /
# i f n d e f PI
cons t double PI =3.141592653589793238462643;
# end i f
# in c lude " s t d a f x . h "
# inc lude < io s t r e am >
# inc lude <cmath >
# inc lude < f s t r e am >
# inc lude <iomanip >
us ing namespace s t d ;
# inc lude <vec t o r >
# inc lude <ct ime >
# inc lude < s t r i n g >
# inc lude <ss t r e am >
# inc lude " EuropeanSwapt ion . h "
# inc lude " normal . h "
i n t _ tmain ( i n t argc , _TCHAR* argv [ ] ) {
/ / i n t main ( ) {
double op t i o n I np , s igmaInp , F0Inp , KInp , r I n p ;
i n t i t e r a t i o n I n p , nrOfTimesInp , f l a g ;
c ou t << " P l a s e t ype i n t h e Opt ion e x p i r a t i o n t ime , i n days , from now \ n and p r e s s t h e r e t u r n bu t t on , ( ex .
6 0 . 0 ) " << end l ;
c i n >> op t i o n I n p ;
cou t << " P l a s e t ype i n t h e o p t i o n s t r i k e p r i c e , ex 95 .0 " << end l ;
c i n >> KInp ;
cou t << " P l a s e t ype i n t h e c u r r e n t Swapt p r i c e , ex 100 .0 " << end l ;
c i n >> F0Inp ;
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cou t << " P l a s e t ype i n t h e v o l a t i l i t y o f t h e Swap , ex . 0 . 8 " << end l ;
c i n >> s igmaInp ;
cou t << " P l a s e t ype i n t h e marke t i n t e r e s t r a t e , ex . 0 . 05 " << end l ;
c i n >> r I n p ;
cou t << " P l a s e t ype i n t h e number o f s im u l a t i o n s i n each run \ n you would l i k e t o pe r fo rm ( ex . 100) \ n (OBS OBS
! We do no t recommend more t h an 100 i f i t i s no t run on Gr id ) " << end l ;
c i n >> i t e r a t i o n I n p ;
cou t << " P l a s e t ype i n t h e number o f t ime s you would l i k e t o run t h e s im u l a t i o n s \ n ( t h i s i s t o s imu l a t e our
Gr id app roach ) " << end l ;
c i n >> nrOfTimesInp ;
f l a g = 1 ;
/ / De f i n e o p t i o n pa rame t e r s
cons t double& T_Option = ( o p t i o n I n p +0 . 0 ) / 3 6 5 . 0 ; / / t ime t o ma t u r i t y f o r t h e o p t i o n
/ / De f i n e Swap parame t e r s
cons t double& sigma = ( s igmaInp +0 . 0 ) ; / / Assume v o l a t i l e
cons t double& F0 = ( F0Inp +0 . 0 ) ; / / Swap i n t =0
cons t double& K = ( KInp +0 . 0 ) ; / / S t r i k e p r i c e o p t i o n ( and mayby t h e a l s o t h e swap )
/ / De f i n e macro economic f a c t o r s
cons t double& r = r I n p ; / / t h i s i s t h e i n t r e s t r a t e f o r t h e whole p e r i o d
/ / d e f i n e d i v . v a r i a b l e s
i n t n_hedge ; / / # o f r e d i s t r i b u t e t h e p o r t f o l i o (# o f hedges )
double h ; / / a v a r i a l b e k e ep i ng t r a c k o f t h e t ime be tween each hedg ing
double H1 ; / / t h e hedg ing p o s i t i o n t a k en i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g swap
double H0F ; / / t h e non hedged p o s i t i o n
double t = 0 . 0 ; / / t ime coun t e r
i n t h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s = 8 ; / / t h e number o f hed ing s t r a t e g i e
double va l u e ; / / f i n a l v a l u e o f p o r t f o l i o
cons t double INF = 9999999 . 9 ;
s r a nd ( ( unsigned ) t ime ( 0 ) ) ; / / u s e s t h e t ime f o r seed i n t h e random gen e r a t o r . We b e l i e v e t h a t t h e b u i l t−i n
g e n e r a t o r i s good enough f o r our i l l u s t r a t i n g purpose
i n t p o s i t i o n = 0 ; / / u se as a c oun t i n g v a r i a b l e
/ / each p r o c e s s hav ing " p a r t i t i o n " s t e p s an we s im u l a t e " i t e r a t i o n " t im e s
i n t i t e r a t i o n = i n t ( i t e r a t i o n I n p ) ; / / t h i s whole program i s run s e v e r a l t im e s on t h e Grid
i n t p a r t i t i o n = 60000 ;
/ / t e x t s t r i n g t o name t h e f i l e s
s t r i n g h e l e ;
/ / l e t t i n g t h e t ime s t e p s be t h e o p t i o n e x p i r a t i o n t ime d i v i d e d by t h e numbers o f p a r t i t i o n s
double d e l t a _ t = T_Option / p a r t i t i o n ;
i n t l e n g t h = 1001 ; / / l e n g t h o f t h e o u t p u t v e c t o r s
cons t double& ha l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r = 0 .5* sigma* sigma + r ; / / i n o rde r t o avo id c a l c u a t i n g l a t e r
cons t double& r_T_op t i on = r *T_Option ;
cons t double& r_min_ha l f _ s i gma_ sqp r = r−s igma* sigma / 2 . 0 ;
cons t double& s i gm a _ s q r t _ d e l t a _ t = sigma* s q r t ( d e l t a _ t ) ;
cons t double& r_m i n _ h a l f _ s i gma _ s q p r _ d e l t a _ t = r _m in_ha l f _ s i gma_ sqp r * d e l t a _ t ;
/ / V e c t o r s :
vec t o r <double > Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s ( p a r t i t i o n ) ; / / b u i l d i n g a p r i c e p r o c e s s w i t h p a r t i t i o n s t e p s
vec t o r <double > Quadra t i c_mean ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / h e l p i n g v a r i a b l e f o r v a r i a n c e f o r each hedg ing
s t r a t e g y
vec t o r <double > Mean_calc ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / a h e l p i n g v a r i a b l e f o r mean f o r each hedg ing s t r a t e g y
vec t o r <double > Mean ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / mean o f t h e d i f f e r e n t hedg ing s t r a t e g i e s
vec t o r <double > Va r i ance ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / v a r i a n c e o f t h e d i f f e r e n t hedg ing s t r a t e g i e s
vec t o r <double > MinPayoff ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / t h e minimum pa y o f f
vec t o r <double > MaxPayoff ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / t h e maximum pa y o f f
/ / v e c t o r <double > Repa r t i t i o nHedg e ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / t o show t h e r e p a r t i t i o n when nr_hedge = 60;
vec t o r <double > Repa r t i t i o nSwap ( l e n g t h ) ; / / t o show t h e r e p a r t i t i o n o f swaps ;
/ / b u i l d i n g a ma t r i x which w i l l c o n s i s t o f va lue−i n t e r v a l l s t o show t h e e f f e c t o f d i f f e r e n t hedg ing
s t r a t e g i e s
v e c t o r < ve c t o r <double > > Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e ;
R ep a r t i t i o nHedg e . r e s i z e ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e . s i z e ( ) ; i ++) {
Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ i ] . r e s i z e ( l e n g t h ) ;
}
double maxvalue = 0 . 0 ;
/ / Value o f t h e c a l l swap t i on Black−Scho l e s−Merton , s e e append i x f o r d e r i v a t i o n
double v a l u e _ o p t i o n = p r i c e _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( F0 ,K, r , sigma , T_Option , t , h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r , f l a g ) ;
/ / s t a r t v a l u e s f o r Hedging
double s t a r t _ h e d g e = d e l t a _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( F0 , K, r , sigma , T_Option , t , h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r , f l a g ) ;
double s t a r t _ v a l u e _ p o r t f o l i o = v a l u e _ o p t i o n − s t a r t _ h e d g e *F0 ;
f o r ( i n t nrOfTimes = 0 ; nrOfTimes < nrOfTimesInp ; nrOfTimes ++) {
cou t << " Pe r f o rm ing run nr : " << nrOfTimes+1 << end l ;
f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j < h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; j ++) {
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < l e n g t h ; i ++)
Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ j ] [ i ] = 0 ;
}
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < l e n g t h ; i ++)
Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ i ]= 0 ;
t = 0 . 0 ;
maxvalue = 0 . 0 ;
/ / i n i t i a l i z e hedg ing v e c t o r
f o r ( i n t l = 0 ; l < h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; l ++) {
Quadra t i c_mean [ l ] = 0 . 0 ;
xiii
Mean_calc [ l ] = 0 . 0 ;
MinPayoff [ l ] = INF ;
MaxPayoff [ l ] = −INF ;
}
/ / Th i s i s t h e s i m u l a t i o n t o be done " i t e r a t i o n " t im e s
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < i t e r a t i o n ; i ++) {
v a l u e = 0 . 0 ;
/ / s i m u l a t e t h e swap pa th
Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s = p r i c e _ p r o c e s s ( F0 , r , sigma , d e l t a _ t , p a r t i t i o n , r _m i n _ h a l f _ s i gma_ s q p r _ d e l t a _ t
, s i gm a _ s q r t _ d e l t a _ t ) ;
/ / remembers t h e maximum t r ad ed end p r i c e f o r swap i n o rde r t o f i n d t h e wor s t outcome f o r va l u e
maxvalue = max ( maxvalue , Swap_p r i c e_p ro c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1]) ;
/ / i n s e r t i n h i s t og ram f o r swap p r i c e s
i f ( Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1]> 400 . 0 )
Rep a r t i t i o nSwap [ l e ng t h−1] +=1;
e l s e
Repa r t i t i o nSwap [ i n t ( f l o o r ( Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1 ]*10 . 0 / 4 . 0 ) ) ] +=1;
/ / D i f f e r e n t hedg ing s t r a t e g i e s
f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k< h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; k++) {
/ / d e t e rm i n e which number t o use f o r t h e hedge
sw i t ch ( k ) {
case 0 : n_hedge = 0 ; break ;
case 1 : n_hedge = 1 ; break ;
case 2 : n_hedge = 2 ; break ;
case 3 : n_hedge = 6 ; break ;
case 4 : n_hedge = 60 ; break ;
case 5 : n_hedge = 600 ; break ;
case 6 : n_hedge = 6000 ; break ;
case 7 : n_hedge = 60000 ; break ;
}
i f ( n_hedge == 0) {
v a l u e = v a l u e _ o p t i o n − p r i c e _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1] ,K, r , sigma ,
T_Option , T_Option , h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r , f l a g ) ;
Quadra t i c_mean [ k ] = Quadra t i c_mean [ k ] + va l u e * va l u e ;
Mean_calc [ k ] = Mean_calc [ k ] + va l u e ;
MinPayoff [ k ] = min ( MinPayoff [ k ] , v a l u e ) ;
MaxPayoff [ k ] = max ( MaxPayoff [ k ] , v a l u e ) ;
/ / i n s e r t i n h i s t og ram f o r hedge ing
i f ( v a l u e <= −80.0)
R ep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ 0 ] +=1;
e l s e i f ( v a l u e >= 2 0 . 0 )
R ep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ l e ng t h−1] +=1;
e l s e
Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ i n t ( f l o o r ( v a l u e *10 . 0 ) +800) ] +=1;
}
e l s e i f ( n_hedge == 1) {
v a l u e = s t a r t _ h e d g e * Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1]*exp(− r _T_op t i on ) +
s t a r t _ v a l u e _ p o r t f o l i o − p r i c e _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1] ,K, r ,
sigma , T_Option , T_Option , h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r , f l a g ) ;
Quadra t i c_mean [ k ] = Quadra t i c_mean [ k ] + va l u e * va l u e ;
Mean_calc [ k ] = Mean_calc [ k ] + va l u e ;
MinPayoff [ k ] = min ( MinPayoff [ k ] , v a l u e ) ;
MaxPayoff [ k ] = max ( MaxPayoff [ k ] , v a l u e ) ;
/ / i n s e r t i n h i s t og ram f o r hedge ing
i f ( v a l u e <= −80.0)
R ep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ 0 ] +=1;
e l s e i f ( v a l u e >= 2 0 . 0 )
R ep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ l e ng t h−1] +=1;
e l s e
Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ i n t ( f l o o r ( v a l u e *10 . 0 ) +800) ] +=1;
}
e l s e {
h = T_Option / n_hedge ;
H1 = s t a r t _ h e d g e ;
H0F = s t a r t _ v a l u e _ p o r t f o l i o ;
f o r ( i n t j =1 ; j <n_hedge ; j ++) {
t = j * h ;
p o s i t i o n = i n t ( t * p a r t i t i o n / T_Option ) ;
v a l u e = H1 * Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p o s i t i o n ] + H0F * exp ( r *h ) ;
H1 = d e l t a _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p o s i t i o n ] , K, r , sigma , T_Option , t ,
h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r , f l a g ) ;
H0F = va l u e − H1* Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p o s i t i o n ] ;
}
v a l u e = (H1* Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1] + H0F*exp ( r *h ) ) * exp(− r _T_op t i on ) −
p r i c e _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( Swap_p r i c e_p r o c e s s [ p a r t i t i o n −1] ,K, r , sigma , T_Option ,
T_Option , h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r , f l a g ) ;
Quadra t i c_mean [ k ] = Quadra t i c_mean [ k ] + va l u e * va l u e ;
Mean_calc [ k ] = Mean_calc [ k ] + va l u e ;
MinPayoff [ k ] = min ( MinPayoff [ k ] , v a l u e ) ;
MaxPayoff [ k ] = max ( MaxPayoff [ k ] , v a l u e ) ;
/ / i n s e r t i n h i s t og ram f o r hedge ing
i f ( v a l u e <= −80.0)
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Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ 0 ] +=1;
e l s e i f ( v a l u e >= 2 0 . 0 )
R ep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ l e ng t h−1] +=1;
e l s e




/ / F i l e s t o keep t h e r e s u l t s i n
s t r i n g f i l e = " v a l u e " ;
s t r i n g x l s = " . x l s " ;
s t r i n g n r ;
s t r i n g s t r e am ou t ;
ou t << nrOfTimes ;
n r = ou t . s t r ( ) ;
h e l e = f i l e +nr+ x l s ;
/ / t o E x c e l l
o f s t r e am f i c h i e r ;
f i c h i e r . open ( h e l e . c _ s t r ( ) , i o s : : ou t ) ;
f i c h i e r << i t e r a t i o n << " \ n " ;
f i c h i e r << maxvalue << " \ n " ;
f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k< h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; k++)
f i c h i e r << Mean_calc [ k ] << " \ t " << Quadra t i c_mean [ k ] << " \ t " << MinPayoff [ k ] << " \ t " << MaxPayoff [
k ] << " \ n " ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i <= l eng t h −1; i ++) {
f i c h i e r << Repa r t i t i o nSwap [ i ] << " \ t " ;
f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k< h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; k++)
f i c h i e r << Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e [ k ] [ i ] << " \ t " ;
f i c h i e r << " \ n " ;
}
f i c h i e r . c l o s e ( ) ;
}
/ / read in , do c a l c u l a t i o n s and keep t h e r e s u l t s i n " i n f o rma t i o n . x l s "
i f s t r e am i n F i l e ;
o f s t r e am o u t F i l e ;
o u t F i l e . open ( " i n f o rm a t i o n . x l s " , i o s : : ou t ) ;
i n t i t e r a t i o n 1 = 0 ;
i n t t e m p _ i t e r a t i o n ;
double hedge1 = 0 . 0 ;
double swap1 = 0 . 0 ;
double mean1 = 0 . 0 ;
double quad1 = 0 . 0 ;
double minimum1 = INF ;
double maximum1 =−INF ;
double maxSwap1 =0 . 0 ;
v e c t o r <double > Quadra t i c_mean1 ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / h e l p i n g v a r i a b l e f o r v a r i a n c e f o r each hedg ing
s t r a t e g y
vec t o r <double > Mean_calc1 ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / a h e l p i n g v a r i a b l e f o r mean1 f o r each hedg ing s t r a t e g y
vec t o r <double > Mean1 ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / mean1 o f t h e d i f f e r e n t hedg ing s t r a t e g i e s
vec t o r <double > Var i ance1 ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / v a r i a n c e o f t h e d i f f e r e n t hedg ing s t r a t e g i e s
vec t o r <double > MinPayoff1 ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / t h e minimum1 p a y o f f
vec t o r <double > MaxPayoff1 ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ; / / t h e maximum1 p a y o f f
vec t o r <double > Repa r t i t i o nSwap1 ( l e n g t h ) ; / / t o show t h e r e p a r t i t i o n o f swaps ;
v e c t o r < ve c t o r <double > > Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e1 ;
Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e1 . r e s i z e ( h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ) ;
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e1 . s i z e ( ) ; i ++) {
Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e1 [ i ] . r e s i z e ( l e n g t h ) ;
}
f o r ( i n t l = 0 ; l < h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; l ++) {
Quadra t i c_mean1 [ l ] = 0 . 0 ;
Mean_calc1 [ l ] = 0 . 0 ;
MinPayoff1 [ l ] = INF ;
MaxPayoff1 [ l ] = −INF ;
}
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < nrOfTimesInp ; i ++) {
s t r i n g f i l e = " v a l u e " ;
s t r i n g x l s = " . x l s " ;
s t r i n g n r ;
s t r i n g s t r e am ou t ;
ou t << i ;
n r = ou t . s t r ( ) ;
h e l e = f i l e +n r+ x l s ;
i n F i l e . open ( h e l e . c _ s t r ( ) , i o s : : i n ) ;
/ / Read i n t h e i n f i l e
i f ( ! i n F i l e ) {
}
e l s e {
i n F i l e >> t em p _ i t e r a t i o n ;
i t e r a t i o n 1 = i t e r a t i o n 1 + t em p _ i t e r a t i o n ;
i n F i l e >> maxSwap1 ;
f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k < h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; k++) {
xv
i n F i l e >> mean1 >> quad1 >> minimum1 >> maximum1 ;
Mean_calc1 [ k ] = Mean_calc1 [ k ]+mean1 ;
Quadra t i c_mean1 [ k ] = Quadra t i c_mean1 [ k ] + quad1 ;
MinPayoff1 [ k ] = min ( MinPayoff1 [ k ] , minimum1 ) ;
MaxPayoff1 [ k ] = max ( MaxPayoff1 [ k ] , maximum1 ) ;
}
f o r ( i n t j = 0 ; j < l e n g t h ; j ++) {
i n F i l e >> swap1 ;
Repa r t i t i o nSwap1 [ j ] = Repa r t i t i o nSwap1 [ j ] + swap1 ;
f o r ( i n t m = 0 ; m < h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; m++) {
i n F i l e >> hedge1 ;




i n F i l e . c l o s e ( ) ;
}
/ / p r e s e n t i n t h e f i l e " i n f o rma t i o n . x l s "
o u t F i l e << s e t p r e c i s i o n ( 4 ) << "maxSwap \ t " << maxSwap1 << " \ n " ;
o u t F i l e << "Mean" << " \ t " << " Va r i ance " << " \ t " << "Max l o s s " << " \ t " << "Max Gain " << " \ n " ;
f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k< h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; k++) {
Mean1 [ k ] = Mean_calc1 [ k ] / i t e r a t i o n 1 ;
Va r i ance1 [ k ] = Quadra t i c_mean1 [ k ] / i t e r a t i o n 1− Mean1 [ k ]*Mean1 [ k ] ;
o u t F i l e << s e t p r e c i s i o n ( 4 ) << Mean1 [ k ] << " \ t " << Var i ance1 [ k ] << " \ t " << MinPayoff1 [ k ] << " \ t " <<
MaxPayoff1 [ k ] << " \ n " ;
}
o u t F i l e << " i n t e r v a l swap " << " \ t " <<"Number o f o c c u r e n c e s o f v a l u e swap1 " << " \ t " ;
o u t F i l e << " i n t e r v a l hedge " << " \ t " << " 0 \ t 1 \ t 2 \ t 6 \ t 60 \ t 600 \ t 6000 \ t 60000 " << end l ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i <= l eng t h −1; i ++) {
o u t F i l e << i * 4 . 0 / 1 0 . 0 << " \ t " << Repa r t i t i o nSwap1 [ i ] << " \ t " << ( i −800.0) / 1 0 . 0 << " \ t " ;
f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k< h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; k++)
o u t F i l e << Rep a r t i t i o nHedg e1 [ k ] [ i ] << " \ t " ;
o u t F i l e << " \ n " ;
}
/ / ou t t o c on s o l e
cou t << "The mean , v a r i a n c e , maximum l o s s and maximum ga i n i s f o r t h e \ n European swap t i on pu t " ;
c ou t << " wi th s t a r t v a l u e " <<F0 << " , e x p e r i a t i o n i n "<< op t i o n I n p <<" days , \ n wi th s t a r t swap p r i c e "<<
F0Inp <<" , s t r i k e "<< KInp <<" , v o l a t i l i t y "<< sigmaInp <<" , \ n and i n t e r e s t r a t e "<< r I n p <<" , \ n \ n " ;
c ou t << " Hedges " << " \ t \ t " << "Mean" << " \ t \ t "<< " Va r i ance " << " \ t " << "Max l o s s " << " \ t " << "Max Gain "
<< " \ n " ;
f o r ( i n t k = 0 ; k< h e d g i n g _ s t r a t e g i e s ; k++) {
Mean1 [ k ] = Mean_calc1 [ k ] / i t e r a t i o n 1 ;
Va r i ance1 [ k ] = Quadra t i c_mean1 [ k ] / i t e r a t i o n 1− Mean1 [ k ]*Mean1 [ k ] ;
sw i t ch ( k ) {
case 0 : cou t << " Naked \ t " ; break ;
case 1 : cou t << " Immedia te \ t " ; break ;
case 2 : cou t << " 2 t ime s \ t " ; break ;
case 3 : cou t << " 6 t ime s \ t " ; break ;
case 4 : cou t << " 60 t ime s \ t " ; break ;
case 5 : cou t << " 600 t ime s \ t " ; break ;
case 6 : cou t << " 6 ,000 t ime s \ t " ; break ;
case 7 : cou t << " 60 ,000 t ime s \ t " ; break ;
}
cou t << l e f t << s c i e n t i f i c << s e t p r e c i s i o n ( 1 ) << showpos << Mean1 [ k ] << " \ t "<< l e f t << Var i ance1 [ k ] <<
" \ t "<< l e f t << MinPayoff1 [ k ] << " \ t " << l e f t << MaxPayoff1 [ k ] << " \ n " ;
}
cou t << " \ n And t h e p r i c e o f t h e o p t i o n i s : " << f i x e d << s e t p r e c i s i o n ( 2 ) << v a l u e _ o p t i o n <<" \ n " ;
c ou t << " \ n For more i n f o rm a t i o n o f t h e r e p a r t i t i o n o f t h e swap p r i c e s \ n o r r e p a r t i t i o n o f hedg ing
r e s u l t s , \ n s e e t h e e x c e l document named \ " i n f o rm a t i o n . x l s \ " " ;
c ou t << " \ n \ n P r e s s any key , and t h an t h e e n t e r key " ;
s t r i n g a ;
c i n >> a ;
re turn 0 ;
}
# inc lude " s t d a f x . h "
# inc lude < io s t r e am >
# inc lude <cmath >
# inc lude < f s t r e am >
# inc lude <iomanip >
us ing namespace s t d ;
# inc lude <vec t o r >
# inc lude " normal . h "
double d1 ( cons t double& Swap ,
cons t double& K,
cons t double& r ,
cons t double& sigma ,
cons t double& time ,
cons t double& ha l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) {
double dOne ;
i f ( t ime <= 0 . 0 )
dOne = −100000; / / i n o rde r t o avo id f a u l t w i t h " doub l e "
e l s e
dOne =( l og ( Swap /K) + ( h a l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) * t ime ) / ( s igma* s q r t ( t ime ) ) ;
re turn dOne ;
} ;
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double d2 ( cons t double& Swap ,
cons t double& K,
cons t double& r ,
cons t double& sigma ,
cons t double& time ,
cons t double& ha l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) {
double dTwo ;
dTwo = d1 ( Swap , K, r , sigma , t ime , h a l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) − s igma* s q r t ( t ime ) ;
re turn dTwo ;
} ;
double p r i c e _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( cons t double& Swap ,
cons t double& Kp ,
cons t double& r ,
cons t double& sigma ,
cons t double& t ime_op t i on ,
cons t double& time ,
cons t double& ha l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ,
i n t& f l a g ) {
double a ;
double b ;
double p r i s = 0 . 0 ;
i f ( f l a g == 1)
p r i s = (Kp*N( −d2 ( Swap , Kp , r , sigma , t ime_op t i on−t ime , h a l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) ) * exp(− r * ( t ime_op t i on−
t ime ) )− Swap*N( −d1 ( Swap , Kp , r , sigma , t ime_op t i on−t ime , h a l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) ) ) ;
i f ( f l a g == 2) {
/ / p r i s = Swap*N( −d1 ( Swap , Kp , r , sigma , t ime_op t i o n−t ime , h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) )−Kp*N( −d2 ( Swap ,
Kp , r , sigma , t ime_op t i o n−t ime , h a l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) ) * exp(−r * ( t ime_op t i o n−t ime ) ) ;
a = Swap*N( d1 ( Swap , Kp , r , sigma , t ime_op t i on−t ime , h a l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) ) ;
b = −Kp*N( d2 ( Swap , Kp , r , sigma , t ime_op t i on−t ime , h a l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) ) * exp(− r * ( t ime_op t i on−t ime ) ) ;
p r i s = a + b ;
}
i f ( p r i s < 0 )
p r i s = 0 . 0 ;
re turn p r i s ;
} ;
double d e l t a _ e u r o p e a n _ swap t i o n ( cons t double& Swap ,
cons t double& Kp ,
cons t double& r ,
cons t double& sigma ,
cons t double& t ime_op t i on ,
cons t double& time ,
cons t double& ha l f _ s i gma_ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ,
i n t& f l a g ) {
double d e l t a = 0 . 5 ;
double k = 0 . 0 1 ;
double dOne = d1 ( Swap , Kp , r , sigma , t ime_op t i on−t ime , h a l f _ s i gm a _ s q r _ p l u s s _ r ) ;
i f ( f l a g == 1) {
i f ( dOne > 0 . 0 )
d e l t a = N( dOne ) −1.0;
e l s e i f ( dOne < 0 . 0 )
d e l t a = −N(−dOne ) ;
}
i f ( f l a g == 2) {
i f ( dOne > 0)
d e l t a = N( dOne ) ;
e l s e i f ( dOne < 0)
d e l t a = 1.0−N(−dOne ) ;
}
re turn d e l t a ;
} ;
/ / c r e a t e t h e p r i c e p r o c e s s v e c t o r , s e e append i x f o r d e r i v a t i o n
vec t o r <double > p r i c e _ p r o c e s s ( cons t double& F0 ,
cons t double& r ,
cons t double& sigma ,
cons t double& d e l t a _ t ,
cons t i n t& p a r t i t i o n ,
cons t double& r_m i n _ h a l f _ s i gma_ s q p r _ d e l t a _ t ,
cons t double& s i gm a _ s q r t _ d e l t a _ t ) {
v e c t o r <double > p r i c e s ( p a r t i t i o n ) ;
double F_t = F0 ; / / i n i t i a l i z a t i o n
f o r ( i n t i =0 ; i < p a r t i t i o n ; ++ i ) {
F_ t = F_t * exp ( r _m i n _ h a l f _ s i gma _ s q p r _ d e l t a _ t + s i gm a _ s q r t _ d e l t a _ t * g a u s s i e n n e ( ) ) ;
p r i c e s [ i ]= F_ t ;
} ;
re turn p r i c e s ;
} ;
# inc lude " s t d a f x . h "
# inc lude < io s t r e am >
# inc lude <cmath >
# inc lude < f s t r e am >
# inc lude <iomanip >
us ing namespace s t d ;
# inc lude <vec t o r >
xvii
# i f n d e f PI
cons t double PI =3.141592653589793238462643;
# end i f
double n ( cons t double& x ) {
double norm = 1 / s q r t (2* PI ) * exp (−(x*x ) / 2 ) ;
re turn norm ;
} ;
/ / U n i v a r i a t e c umu l a t i v e normal d i s t r i b u t i o n
/ / from Hul l
double N( cons t double& x ) {
double p = 0 . 2316419 ;
double b1 = 0 .319381530 ;
double b2 = −0.356563782;
double b3 = 1 .781477937 ;
double b4 = −1.821255978;
double b5 = 1 .330274429 ;
double t a = 1 / ( 1+ p*x ) ;
double norm ;
i f ( x >= 0)
norm = 1 − n ( x ) * ( b1* t a +b2*pow ( ta , 2 ) +b3*pow ( ta , 3 ) +b4*pow ( ta , 4 ) +b5*pow ( ta , 5 ) ) ;
e l s e
norm = 1−N(−x ) ;
re turn norm ;
} ;





g = 9999999999999 .0 ; / / U t i l i s e a NaN i n t h e b e g i n i n g
whi le ( ( g > 100000000) | | ( g < −100000000) ) {
two = rand ( ) / double (RAND_MAX) ;
one = rand ( ) / double (RAND_MAX) ;
g = s q r t (−2.0 * log ( one ) ) * cos ( 2 . 0 * PI * two ) ;
} ;
re turn g ;
} ;
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